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Through a review of reported challenges this article explains how latent fingerprint evidence was routinely 
admitted and relied upon as proof of identity in criminal proceedings before its value and limitations were 
studied and understood. That it was admitted and used in ways that were disengaged from scientific research 
reveals a great deal about our system of pleas, rules of admission, trial safeguards, and the technical competence 
of lawyers and judges. This article draws on contemporary research to explain how more than a century of 
routine legal reliance along with quite a few admissibility challenges produced few meaningful responses and no 
apparent endogenous understanding of the limitations of latent fingerprint comparison among lawyers. Trial 
personnel and trial safeguards did not lead to the identification, recognition and communication of limitations 
and uncertainties. Given the long and widespread use of latent fingerprint evidence there are few challenges 
focused on the actual value of the evidence. Latent fingerprint evidence continues to be presented in ways that 
are not based on scientific research, are inconsistent with the mainstream scientific advice, and exaggerate the 
value of opinions in ways that systematically advance the state and threaten both rectitude and fairness in 
criminal proceedings. 
 





This article surveys the record of legal challenges to latent fingerprint evidence in Australian 
criminal proceedings.1 Starting with the first appeals at the beginning of the twentieth century 
and continuing up to the present day it documents both the way lawyers sought to impugn 
fingerprint evidence and the way trial judges and appellate courts responded.2 Through 
reference to contemporary scientific research, the article explains how our admissibility rules 
and procedure, and even our oft-celebrated trial safeguards, did not apprise decision-makers – 
whether judges or juries – of the many uncertainties, risks and limitations associated with 
latent fingerprint evidence.3 Legal responses to latent fingerprint evidence reveal that 
Australian courts allowed latent fingerprint examiners to make categorical assertions about 
identity from the very beginning. This permissive disposition persisted as new technologies 
were adopted, as rules of evidence and procedure were reformed, and as controversies and 
criticism slowly emerged beyond the courts. Today, the epistemological limitations of latent 
fingerprint evidence and criticism of legal responses to this evidence remain (almost) 
unknown to law.  
 Drawing on the long history of reported decisions, the number of cases involving serious 
epistemological challenges – engaged with the validity and scientific reliability of latent 
fingerprint evidence – is tiny.4 Indeed, for the period from 1900 to 2017 there appears to be 
                                                        
† Professor, School of Law, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052 and Chair, Evidence-based Forensics 
Initiative. 
1 Latent fingerprints are those that are not visible to the naked eye. Most fingerprints are latent - visualised through 
powders, chemical processes and/or special lighting. Some fingerprints, such as those left in blood or oil, or from inked 
fingers, are not latent.  
2 The article covers the twentieth century and concludes with the appeal in R v Parry [2017] SASCFC 66. 
3 This article is concerned with latent fingerprints, not identification by ten print sets, which is a very different activity 
that is now practically automated. 
4 This study focuses on reported decisions and those available on the electronic databases such as Austlii and Westlaw. 
Databases were searched using terms such as ‘finger! w/20 expert’ and finger! w/20 admiss!’ as well as through cross-
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just one. Rather than facilitate engagement with scientific research in order to make 
fingerprint examiners accountable and their opinions comprehensible for judges and juries, 
oft-celebrated legal protections have been overwhelmingly focused on non-epistemic issues 
and epiphenomena. Perhaps the most revealing and disconcerting dimension of this account is 
the apparent failure of any judge to ever require a latent fingerprint examiner to provide 
independent evidence of the accuracy of latent fingerprint comparison. Australian judges are 
yet to receive an indication of the error rate, or information about limitations and 
uncertainties that have come to be notorious among attentive scientists.  
 This research is revealing because the record demonstrates that trial safeguards did not 
encourage or enable lawyers to identify, explore or convey epistemological problems with 
latent fingerprint evidence and the procedures used by latent fingerprint examiners. This 
failure was not some isolated mistake or aberration. It has persisted for more than a century, 
while latent fingerprint evidence was presented (by prosecutors and fingerprint examiners) 
and understood (by defence lawyers, judges, jurors and perhaps defendants) as inviolable 
proof of identity. It persisted as authoritative scientific organisations began to question latent 
fingerprint evidence and its legal reception as categorical evidence of identity. Scientific 
research exposes unremitting credulity in response to forensic science evidence adduced by 
the state in criminal proceedings. Simultaneously it illustrates the institutional and social 
repercussions of not imposing some kind of reliability criterion on the reception of forensic 
science and forensic medicine evidence (routinely) adduced by the state.  
 
Some notes on my methods 
This article is focused on challenges to latent fingerprint evidence that were recorded in law 
reports or ‘published’ on electronic databases.5 While some of the challenges to latent 
fingerprint evidence will be lost through this orientation, it offers the tangible benefit of 
presenting and reviewing materials that were readily available to generations of lawyers and 
judges.6 These decisions embody legal authority and legal knowledge. There may have been 
sophisticated methodological challenges to latent fingerprint evidence that were not reported 
but that seems unlikely; for reasons that will become apparent. Moreover, to the extent that 
insights or sophistication were not reported they appear to have been lost. We might 
reasonably wonder about the existence of insights and knowledge that are not conspicuous in 
the reported decisions and seem to be unknown to generations of lawyers and judges. There is 
no evidence of it in the reported decisions.7 
 Secondly, this article moves beyond the law reports and draws upon mainstream scientific 
research in order to enhance understanding of latent fingerprint evidence. Fortunately, the last 
decade has generated a wealth of materials following a series of independent reviews – 
discussed in Section 3. These scientific reviews are vitally important because they expose 
serious discrepancies between legal representations of latent fingerprint comparison evidence 
and scientific understanding and expectations. Prominent here is the fact that the first 
rigorous scientific studies of latent fingerprint comparison were finally conducted during the 
last decade – i.e. since 2009. This is revealing because latent fingerprints comparison has 
been in routine use for more than a century, and yet many of those producing and relying 
upon it were oblivious or indifferent to the absence of scientific foundations. The results of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
referencing from these decisions. In some cases searches were focused on specific terms, such as ‘ACE-V’ or 
‘superglue’ or ‘points’. 
5 Many of the earliest trials were reported in contemporaneous newspapers. 
6 This is not an attempt to comprehensively document the historical record, but an attempt to consider what the 
accessible legal record reveals.  
7 These might be located in writings, speeches and submissions. This article has generally relied on reported decisions, 
for the reasons explained. 
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the emerging scientific research provide a standard (or benchmark) that enables us to evaluate 
both latent fingerprint evidence and the legal responses. 
 Thirdly, in this article the challenges to latent fingerprint evidence are characterised as 
either legal (or non-epistemic) or epistemological.8 For the entire twentieth century 
challenges to latent fingerprint evidence were overwhelmingly legal in focus. With very few 
exceptions they were directed toward legal criteria, such as (non-)compliance with collection 
and reporting procedures, the admissibility of photographs, the role of the jury in the 
evaluation of fingerprint evidence, and whether judicial directions were appropriate. While 
there is nothing remarkable about lawyers and judges engaging with relevant legislation, legal 
criteria and case law, persistent insensitivity to the validity of the underlying procedures and 
the abilities of latent fingerprint examiners is an issue that demands attention. This essay is 
fundamentally concerned with epistemology.9 It focuses attention on methods (and 
assumptions) and the known value of fingerprint evidence – drawn from scientific research. 
As we shall see, remarkably few historical challenges to the admission and use of fingerprint 
evidence engaged with these fundamental issues.10  
 Fourthly, nor is my intention to suggest that challenges on predominantly legal grounds 
were without value or inappropriate. Some challenges, focused on procedural irregularities – 
surrounding collection and use, for example – were successful and may have improved out-
of-court investigative behaviours.11 Indeed, in the absence of legal engagement with 
epistemological issues – such as validity and scientific reliability (including accuracy) – this 
focus is comprehensible as one strategy. However, qualified success with legal challenges to 
fingerprint evidence should not be conceived as adequate given the persistent failure to 
engage with the value of latent fingerprint evidence. 
 Fifthly, it is not my intention to whiggishly judge past legal practice by contemporary 
standards.12 Contemporary knowledge does, however, enable us to consider the institutional 
costs of ignorance, including an apparently slavish commitment to trial safeguards and 
protections that were, as the following study demonstrates, mis-used, ineffective or dormant. 
It also allows us to observe the impact of new rules (e.g. UEL s 79) and procedures (e.g. 
Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses), legal responses to emerging technologies (e.g. 
electronic databases and search algorithms), and the recalcitrance of legal attitudes and 
impressions as scientific research and advice emerged. Together, the cases reviewed for this 
article suggest that courts accepted the beliefs and assumptions of latent fingerprint 
examiners and persisted with that commitment even as it became untenable with respect to 
reviews and recommendations produced by peak scientific organisations. Remarkably, this 
                                                        
8 These are working definitions and the boundaries may not always be clear. There are, for example, a few challenges 
that focus on fingerprint examiners testifying about activity (rather than source) or the age of prints and these are 
challenged on the basis of transgression of legal categories. To the extent that some lawyers raised and/or courts 
considered the reliability of latent fingerprint evidence, there are no sophisticated legal pronouncements. See T. Gieryn, 
Cultural boundaries of science (Chicago, 1999); G. Bowker and S. Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences (London: MIT, 1999). 
9 See e.g. E. Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Intellectual Due 
Process (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007); M. Saks and B. Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of 
Evidence Law (New York University Press, New York, 2016); K. Martire and G. Edmond, ‘Rethinking expert opinion 
evidence’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 967. 
10 Apart from a challenge in the Children’s Court of NSW in 2015, and some comments in the Victorian Court of 
Appeal more than a century earlier, there is no evidence of legal engagement with scientific knowledge, the reliability of 
latent fingerprint evidence, the effectiveness of legal procedures, the appropriateness of the form of opinions proffered 
by examiners, and so on. 
11 Although, there is limited evidence of appellate decisions substantially reforming the behaviours of investigators. See 
e.g. R. Leo, ‘The impact of Miranda revisited’ (1996) 86 Journal of Law & Criminology 621. 
12 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (1932, reprinted New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1965); G. 
Edmond, ‘Whigs in Court: Historiographical Problems with Expert Evidence’ (2002) 14 Yale Journal of Law & the 
Humanities123. See also R. Proctor and L. Schiebinger (eds), Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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position persists in relation to latent fingerprint evidence and almost every other type of 
forensic science and medicine, perhaps with qualification in relation to DNA profiling and 
some interpretations of image evidence.13 
 Finally, and importantly, this article recognises that latent fingerprint comparison is 
basically a valid and scientifically reliable procedure.14 The problem, that arises through this 
diachronic analysis, is that this position has only become known – in the sense of being 
supported by scientific research – recently. This raises questions about what lawyers and 
courts were doing for a century and unresolved issues concerning the conditions regulating 
the admission and use of latent fingerprints (and other forensic science) evidence in modern 
criminal proceedings. For, while latent fingerprint evidence is a procedure that is potentially 
quite powerful in assisting with the identification of persons of interest, it is not as probative 
as latent fingerprint examiners, prosecutors and judges have all suggested. And, there is no 
sense that other types of forensic science and forensic medicine, such as image, voice, 
footwear, hair, fibre, document, bitemark, firearm and toolmark comparison, for example, are 
likely to be anywhere near as accurate. That is, to the extent that they turn out to be valid and 
scientifically reliable. Self-evidently, the article has destabilizing implications for the legal 
reception of other types of forensic science and forensic medicine evidence. 
 
2. Latent fingerprint comparison  
Most modern latent fingerprint examiners use a procedure known by the acronym ACE-V.15 
Following the detection and collection of one or more fingerprints connected to a suspected 
criminal offence, this involves analysing the suitability of the prints. Does the quantity and 
quality of detail in the print make it suitable (or sufficient) for comparison.16 Suitable prints 
may be marked-up and searched against a database (where known and unknown prints are 
stored) using one of a range of proprietorial algorithms to select prints that are deemed 
sufficiently similar to undergo comparison by a latent fingerprint examiner. Algorithms 
assemble a ‘pool’ of prints (usually ranking them with some kind of score) from among the 
very large number of prints stored on criminal databases.17 The way latent fingerprints are 
prepared for searching the database and the choice of fingerprints selected for comparison 
(from among the pool) are subjective decisions made by the fingerprint examiner. In some 
cases – e.g. where there is police intelligence or perhaps an admission – the identity of the 
persons whose (reference) fingerprints should be compared to the crime scene latent prints 
might be suggested directly by investigators. Such comparisons, where they produce 
‘matches’, may circumvent the need for database searches.  
 During comparison the examiner looks for similarities and differences between latent 
prints deemed sufficient for comparison and reference prints (or other prints of interest).18 
Because of variation between surfaces, conditions of deposition (e.g. humidity, temperature), 
pressure of contact, cleanliness of hands, age of latent fingerprints, distortion, injury and 
                                                        
13 See e.g. R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233, 242; R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554; R 
v Karger (2001) SASR 1; R v Gallagher (2001) NSWSC 462; Fitzgerald v R [2014] HCA 28; Tuite v The Queen [2015] 
VSCA 148; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; Morgan v R (2011) 215 A Crim 
R 33; [2007] NTCCA 1; R v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109; Morgan v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 
33; Honeysett v R [2013] NSWCCA 135; Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122. 
14 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring 
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (Report, 20 September 2016) 95-97. 
15 The procedure is supposed to be applied in order, but not all examiners do so. In recent years the FBI has required 
examiners to proceed in order in a process described as ‘linear ACE-V’. 
16 B. Ulery et al, ‘Understanding the sufficiency of information for latent fingerprint value determinations’ (2013) 230 
Forensic Science International 99; A. Hicklin et al, ‘Latent fingerprint quality: a survey of examiners’ (2011) 61 
Journal of Forensic Identification 385. 
17 The number of prints in the pool, or the extent of the search, is flexible. 
18 In some cases, examiners might match a latent with fingerprints associated with other crimes, but the identity of the 
source may be unknown. This may have value for investigators, implicating the same person in different crimes. 
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scaring, size, and so on, the fingerprints to be compared are never identical.19 Comparison 
leads to an evaluation. Evaluation involves detailed assessment of ridge features (e.g. whorls, 
loops, bifurcations, ridge endings and islands) and perhaps scars and other features – see 
Figure 1. Following subjective comparison – usually on a computer screen using a variety of 
tools for manipulation and enhancement – the examiner decides whether the prints match or 
do not match. The examiner must be subjectively satisfied of enough similarity to conclude 
that the prints match (i.e. were made by the same person). Alternatively, the examiner might 
observe one or more differences that lead them to characterise the prints as non-matching or 
inconclusive. For a match (or identification), any apparent differences are characterised as not 
meaningful (e.g. artifacts or the result of distortion, a second touch or other interference that 
can be ‘explained’ away).20 For an exclusion, apparent differences are considered to be real 
(rather than artefactual) and so cannot be explained away. Inconclusive determinations reflect 
an examiner’s inability to declare a match and, often, a reluctance to exclude.21 They are 
sometimes expressed in suggestive (i.e. inclusive) language such as ‘cannot exclude’. For 
reasons of convention, ‘inconclusive’ results, though implicitly probative, are not necessarily 




Figure 1: ‘An example of some minutiae locations in a fingerprint’ 23 
 
 The range of potential outcomes introduces a range of possible errors.24 Most obvious are 
false identifications (false positives) and mistaken exclusions (false negatives). Though, 
decisions about sufficiency and the reluctance to identify might also be considered ‘errors’.25 
Regardless of the precise classification and nomenclature, they may entail a (systematic) loss 
of information. All of these decisions (or outcomes) are subjective. Consequently, examiners 
occasionally disagree.26 Though, backstage inconsistencies are almost never disclosed in 
                                                        
19 Though, fingerprints are often characterised as ‘identical’ by examiners and judges, see e.g. Bennett v Police [2005] 
SASC 167. 
20 Though, this is not usually explained, other than being a variation or apparent difference that the examiner does not 
believe compromises the ability to make a match decision. 
21 For an example, see R v Burling [2002] NSWCCA 298, [19]. 
22 Though, see R v Parry [2017] SASCFC 66, discussed below. The dichotomy, along with the reluctance to report 
inconclusive entails a loss of probative evidence, mainly for reasons of tradition. Here we can begin to perceive the 
benefit of probabilistic frameworks that can capture a range of values, rather than relying on categorical claims – i.e. 
match and non-match.  
23 NIST report, 83. This image is adapted from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Fingerprint Manual (Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, 1990) Ch 2.  
24 Match decisions have become vulnerable to error (through so-called adventitious matches) as databases, and the 
number of quite similar but different fingerprints has, increased in recent decades. Some databases contain hundreds of 
millions of prints and algorithms return the most similar prints for subjective comparison. 
25 See I. Dror and G. Langenburg, ‘“Cannot Decide”: The Fine Line Between Appropriate Inconclusive Determinations 
Versus Unjustifiably Deciding Not To Decide’ (2018) Journal of Forensic Science (forthcoming). 
26 See e.g. B. Ulery et al, ‘Measuring What Latent Fingerprint Examiners Consider Sufficient Information for 
Individualization Determinations’ (2015) 10 PLOS One e0118172. 
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reports and testimony.27 Some examiners may be willing to analyse, compare and match 
latent prints that other examiners would consider ‘insufficient’. Examiners are much more 
likely to disagree about whether a latent print is of sufficient quality for comparison than 
whether a particular finger can be matched or excluded.  
 The final stage of ACE-V is verification. Verification stands for a variety of inconsistent 
practices. These can range from another examiner superficially reviewing the first examiner’s 
report (usually for technical compliance purposes, that may focus on spelling and pagination) 
to a full-scale and independent ACE performed in conditions where the first examiner’s 
findings are not disclosed to the second examiner.28 Almost all verification in Australia 
involves a reviewer examining prints in the knowledge that another examiner, frequently 
named and known to the reviewer, has previously matched them.29  
 ACE-V was first described in print in 1959.30 The term first appears in an Australian 
judgment in R v Ghebrat in 2011 and in NSW, at least, was not a regular feature of reports 
before 2015.31 For most of the twentieth century latent fingerprint examiners did not use the 
acronym ‘ACE-V’ or describe their process in these terms. And, for most of the century they 
did not rely on algorithms to search electronic databases for matching prints. Prior to the 
1980s, identification by fingerprints was obtained using a range of different processes and 
methods, not all of which were standardised, scrupulously followed, or described in reports. 
Before fingerprints were captured, recorded and searched electronically, complex systems of 
classification enabled examiners to retrieve prints from very large card reference systems 
sorted according to fingerprint features.32  
 Another aspect of latent fingerprint comparison that is not prominent in the Australian 
decisions, though is a conspicuous feature in the UK, is the reference to point systems. Up 
until the last decade of the twentieth century, rules about the number of points of similarity 
(between ridge features), imposed by police departments and professional organisations, 
governed the ability and willingness of most examiners to describe two similar prints as a 
match – and therefore as positive identification.33 Revealingly, the minimum number of 
points required for a match varied over time and between jurisdictions. The point system was 
largely discredited, and formally abandoned, when a review by two British scientists in the 
1980s concluded that there was no underlying scientific basis, and that the number of points 
relied upon by different fingerprint bureaus (and some courts) was arbitrary.34 Bureaus 
subsequently adopted more holistic approaches, concerned with whether examiners were 
                                                        
27 For an interesting, though exceptional, expose, see the English case of R v Smith [2011] EWCA Crim 1296. 
28 These may operate in parallel. 
29 In most cases, for resource reasons, only matches are reviewed. Those who responsible for verification know that the 
prints they are verifying have been matched. See K. Ballantyne et al, ‘Peer review in forensic science’ (2017) 277 
Forensic Science International 66. 
30 Roy Huber originally described the structure of ACE-V, and proposed it for every forensic comparison discipline, 
without advancing the acronym. ACE-V was popularized by David Ashbaugh, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
from the 1980s. See R. Huber, ‘Expert witness’ (1959) 2 Criminal Law Quarterly 276; D. Ashbaugh, Quantitative-
Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
1999). 
31 Ghebrat, 143, 146; JP, [78], [79]. 
32 Early systems are discussed in Cole, Suspect identities. 
33 The IAI, the largest professional society, looms large here. Until recently (influenced by the NRC report), the IAI 
forbade members from testifying in terms weaker than positive identification, on threat of sanction. 
34 See R v Buckley (1999) 163 JP 561 for an English discussion and inoculation of inconsistency. In Australian cases the 
number of points arises sporadically, and usually in response to prompting in cross-examination. See e.g. Graham, [43]; 
CZB v Children's Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 208, [86]; JP, [27]; R v Milos [2014] QCA 314, [132]; Soutar v 
Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWDC 95, [60]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681, [144]; Bennett v Police [2005] 
SASC 167, [15], [17], [39]-[40]; Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415, [5]-[7], [22], [23], [28]; Mickelberg v The Queen 
[2004] WASCA 145, [186]-[187], [192], [310], [320]-[322], [328], [329], [337], [487], [526]; R v Burling [2002] 
NSWCCA 298, [19]; R v Moore [1982] Qd R 162, 169 (9 points sufficient); MacDonald v A-G (Cth) (1980) 24 SASR 
294, 299. See also HZXD v Innovation Australia (2010) 80 ATR 939, [17]. (Search for (‘fingerprint /20 points’) 
Westlaw 13 August 2018.) 
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personally satisfied that the two prints matched. Though not usually referenced in reports, 
examiners continue to count and refer to points of similarity, particularly if questioned in 
legal proceedings.35 
 Latent fingerprint examiners base their claims and abilities on the premise (for many of 
them a fact) that fingerprints are unique. This is an assumption that, with respect to 
identification, elides a range of quite complex physiological and statistical issues. The main 
problem is the way the commitment to uniqueness is used to support the ability to positively 
identify an individual (to the exclusion of all other possible sources of the latent fingerprint). 
We will return to this issue in the next section, where scientists explicitly question uniqueness 
and its implications for identification and accuracy. 
 The assumptions that fingerprints are permanent and unique are used by examiners to 
support their categorical claims pertaining to the identity of the source (of a latent 
fingerprint). When expressing their opinions the match decision is usually expressed as 
positive identification (or individualisation), sometimes to the exclusion of all other persons. 
Although fingerprint examiners believe this italicized qualification to be redundant; given 
assumptions about uniqueness and permanence. Historically, regardless of the specific 
procedure they employed (or the precise number of points identified), fingerprint examiners 
claimed and were usually allowed to testify that the results of fingerprint comparison (or the 
particular procedure, such as ACE-V) identified a specific person and was error-free. 
Occasionally an examiner might concede that errors are possible, the result of examiner 
incompetence or mistake, rather than an intractable feature of the subjective method(s).36 In 
the few cases where examiners were called and asked about error they typically testified that 
there was no error in the specific case and in general ‘the possibility of error’ was remote or, 
more commonly, theoretical or hypothetical.37 
 In JP v DPP, a case heard in 2015 (and discussed below), a senior NSW Police fingerprint 
examiner testified in the following terms:  
 
A. If the ACE-V methodology is done correct I don’t agree that there’s potentially error rates there.38 
… 
Q.  So you would say that the ACE-V method is infallible is that what you say? 
A.  In the correct - used in the correct method and way and by myself yes.39 
 
The following exchange captured his confidence about the identification: 
 
Q.  What’s your level of confidence in relation to that opinion? 
A.  100 per cent. 
Q.  You’re a hundred per cent certain about that conclusion? 
A.  Yes I am.40 
 
As we shall see, it makes no sense to speak of an infallible method when each stage of ACE-
V requires an examiner to engage in subjective assessments – i.e. interpretation.41 The fact 
that interpretation is predicated upon untestable and somewhat misleading assumptions about 
                                                        
35 Consider the reference in Bennett, below. 
36 S. Cole, ‘More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification.’ (2005) 95 Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminology 985. 
37 See the extract from Reg. v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 reproduced in Section 5. The ‘possibility of error’ is taken 
from a contemporary NSW police pro forma. 
38 Transcript of Proceedings, R v JP (27 January 2015) 10. 
39 Transcript of Proceedings, R v JP (27 January 2015) 12-13. 
40 Transcript of Proceedings, R v JP (13 January 2015) 12-13, 25. See also R v Graham (2017) 325 FLR 21, [43] where 
the expert is reported as being ‘100 per cent confident that the print was that of the accused.’ 
41 S. Cole, ‘Forensics without uniqueness, conclusions without individualization: the new epistemology of forensic 
identification’ (2009) 8 Law, Probability & Risk 233. 
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uniqueness, the fact that examiners were not historically sensitive to the frequency and inter-
relatedness of fingerprint features (see Figure 1), or concerned with cognitive bias (e.g. 
suggestion), only compounds the problems. 
 At this point we turn to consider what attentive scientists have to say about latent 
fingerprint evidence and its underpinnings. The perspectives of scientists are revealing 
because notwithstanding latent fingerprint examiners presenting themselves and being 
recognised as forensic scientists, and referring to the ‘science of fingerprints’ from its very 




3. Scientific insight into latent fingerprint comparison 
This article is possible because during the last decade scientists have finally begun to study 
latent fingerprint examiners and their evidence. These studies were undertaken in response to 
high profile mis-identifications, wrongful convictions and innocence projects, scholarly 
criticisms, and the first-ever independent reviews of the forensic sciences. For the first time in 
more than a hundred years we now have a reasonably good idea of the validity of the 
(modern) procedure and its scientific reliability – including its accuracy. This is important 
because now that we have access to empirically-based knowledge we can start to consider 
what courts did in the absence of knowledge. This enables us to reflect on legal awareness (of 
its absence) and historical performances, as well as gauge whether the availability of 
scientific knowledge has transformed contemporary practice. 
 In this section it is my intention to draw attention to research findings and 
recommendations produced by attentive scientists in a range of recent reports and reviews – 
notably Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: The path forward (2009), Latent 
Print Examination and Human Factors (2012), Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: 
Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016) and Forensic Science 
Assessments: A quality and gap analysis – Latent fingerprint examination (2017).43 These 
reports were produced by prestigious scientific and technical organisations, respectively the 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NRC), the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the President’s Council of Advisers on 
Science and Technology (PCAST) and the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS). In addition, inquiries in the US and Scotland, following prominent mis-
identifications (e.g. Brandon Mayfield and Shirley McKie), led to reports, prepared by the 
Department of Justice (US) and a Scottish judge – now Lord Campbell.44 
 The first point to make is that all of the independent scientific reviews insist on the need to 
validate the procedures (or methods) used by latent fingerprint examiners. Validation is a 
process of formal evaluation (or testing), conducted in circumstances where the correct 
answer is known (by those evaluating the procedure), in order to determine whether the 
procedure does what its proponents claim.45 It determines the conditions in which a procedure 
                                                        
42 R v Amatto [2011] NSWDC 194, [2]. 
43 National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National 
Academies Press, 2009); Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print Examination 
and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (US Department of Commerce, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012); PCAST report; W. Thompson et al, Forensic Science Assessments: A 
quality and gap analysis – Latent fingerprint examination (AAAS, Washington DC, 2017).  
44 United States Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (US Department 
of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division, 2006); Anthony Campbell, The Fingerprint 
Inquiry Report (December 2011). 
45 Several of the US reports, attentive to admissibility standards in the United States, even suggested that forensic 
science procedures that had not been formally validated should not be adduced and relied upon in criminal proceedings. 
See e.g. PCAST report, 140 (Recommendation 8.3) and 145 (Recommendation 9.4) 
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is known to work as well as how well it works. PCAST explained it in the following way: 
 
For a metrological method to be scientifically valid and reliable, the procedures that comprise it must be 
shown, based on empirical studies, to be repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that have been 
measured and are appropriate to the intended application.46 
 
PCAST insisted that ‘methods [such as ACE-V] must be presumed to be unreliable until their 
foundational validity has been established based on empirical evidence.’47 Revealingly, the 
NRC Committee, in the first and most influential of the reports, concluded that as of 2009 no 
validation research had been conducted on latent fingerprint comparison.48 Exempting DNA 
profiling, the NRC infamously concluded that none of the remaining comparison procedures 
‘has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of 
certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.’49 
In response, the multi-disciplinary committees responsible for the NRC, NIST and PCAST 
reports called for much greater disclosure and more modest forms of expression by latent 
fingerprint examiners and many other forensic scientists. NIST recommended replacing 
‘[c]laims of “absolute” and “positive” identification’ with ‘more modest claims about the 
meaning and significance of a “match”.’50 
 On ACE-V, the modern incarnation of the procedure, the NRC, NIST, PCAST and AAAS 
all expressed concerns. Rather than a method grounding error-free identification, as suggested 
in the earlier extracts, assessment by the NRC was restrained. 
 
ACE-V provides a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analyses. However, this 
framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis. ACE-V does 
not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that 
two analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons, merely following the steps of 
ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable results.51 
  
 In the wake of critical appraisal by the NRC in 2009 scientific research commenced. The 
first rigorous attempts to evaluate latent fingerprint comparison were published a century 
after Australian appellate courts, including the High Court, accepted that latent fingerprint 
evidence was not only admissible but sufficient to support conviction in a case where there 
was no other evidence. On the basis of recent validation research, what do we now know 
about modern latent fingerprint comparison? Well, scientists found that fingerprint examiners 
are ‘exceedingly accurate compared with novices, but are not infallible.’52 When examiners 
were tested in controlled conditions resembling casework, they were found to make small 
numbers of errors. Reviewing the available research, all conducted in the aftermath of the 
NRC review, PCAST summarised the studies as follows. 
                                                        
46 PCAST report, 47. 
47 PCAST report, 32. 
48 NRC report, 142-45. The Council endorsed the following assessment by Haber and Haber: ‘We have reviewed 
available scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method and found none.’ See L. Haber and R. Haber, 
‘Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence under Daubert’ (2008) 7 Law, Probability & Risk 87. 
49 NRC report, 7-8. 
50 NIST report, 130; NRC report, 142. See J. Mnookin, ‘The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions 
of a Fingerprinting Moderate’ (2008) 7 Law, Probability & Risk 127. 
51 National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States (National Academies Press, 2009) 
(‘NAS Report’) 142-3; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: 
Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (US Department of Commerce, 2012) (‘NIST report’) 8-9; PCAST 
report, 66-81. See G. Edmond, ‘What lawyers should know about the forensic ‘sciences’?’ (2015) 36 Adelaide Law Review 
33. 
52 J. Tangen, M. Thompson and D. McCarthy, ‘Identifying Fingerprint Expertise’ (2011) 22 Psychological Science 995–
7; B. Ulery et al, ‘Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions’ (2011) 108 Proceedings of the 





Table 1: Error rates in studies of latent print analysis.53 
 
Of this research, only the ‘black-box studies’ were characterised as appropriate for 
determining the incidence of error. On the basis of the available empirical research – ‘only 
two properly designed studies of the accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis have been 
conducted’ – PCAST recommended that these results should inform the way latent 
fingerprint examiners report their results.54 
 
PCAST finds that latent fingerprint analysis [has] a false positive rate that is substantial and is likely to 
be higher than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint 
analysis. The false-positive rate could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI study and 1 
error in 18 cases based on a study by another crime laboratory. In reporting results of latent-fingerprint 
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates based on properly designed validation 
studies.55 
 
This information would ‘appropriately inform jurors that errors occur at detectable 
frequencies, allowing them to weigh the probative value of the evidence.’56 This 
recommendation stands in stark contrast to the longstanding presentation of an opinion as 
positive identification that, if questioned, was defended as certain and infallible.57 
 Scientific review exposed other issues. Attentive scientists expressed concerns about the 
way the various stages of ACE-V were described and performed. They found that there were 
few meaningful standards in place. There were, for example, no empirically-informed 
standards around the quality and sufficiency of latent fingerprints used for comparison and 
identification. Moreover, they found that examiners did not agree on the sufficiency of prints 
or the number of points (ridge detail) that could be observed – inter-examiner inconsistency. 
They also found that the same examiners responded inconsistently when presented with the 
same prints on separate occasions – intra-examiner inconsistency.58 
 In addition, latent fingerprint examiners had historically ignored the risks posed by human 
factors.59 Empirical studies demonstrated that fingerprint examiners, like other humans, were 
                                                        
53 PCAST report, 98. Full references and descriptions of all the studies are provided in the PCAST report. 
54 PCAST report, 9. These are likely to change, and probably improve, as more studies are conducted and revised 
procedures (and technologies) put in place. 
55 PCAST report, 9-10, 26, 74. 
56 PCAST report, 74, 26. 
57 Many reports in other jurisdictions refer to the very thin line between the evidence being understood as opinion or 
fact. Indeed, the SFI report, 740, recommended that this should be made clear. 
58 I. Dror et al, ‘Cognitive issues in fingerprint analysis: inter- and intra-expert consistency and the effect of a “Target” 
comparison’ (2011) 208 Forensic Science International 10. 
59 ‘Human factors’ are psychological and physiological factors that threaten forensic science practices and results. 
 11 
vulnerable to cognitive bias, particularly suggestion. One small, though notorious, study by 
Dror and colleagues, led four of five experienced latent fingerprint examiners to reverse their 
decisions on whether two prints matched by priming them with domain irrelevant 
information.60 The work of latent fingerprint examiners was, and in many bureaus remains, 
awash in information that is not required to undertake comparison work. That is, examiners 
are routinely exposed – through contact with detectives, crime scenes, fellow examiners, their 
documentation and databases – to information that is not required to undertake ACE-V and 
may actually subvert interpretation. The verifier being exposed to the result of the original 
examination is yet another example. Historically, like many other forensic scientists, latent 
fingerprint examiners considered themselves immune to cognitive biases because of their 
training and experience. Scientists, in contrast, recommended studying current practices and 
where possible shielding examiners from gratuitous information (e.g. about the crime or the 
suspect) and suggestive processes (e.g. non-blind verification).61 
 The various scientific reports also challenged the significance attributed to uniqueness 
(and permanence) by latent fingerprint examiners.62 There is no doubt that fingerprints are 
highly variable. They might even be unique, though we cannot actually test this. Uniqueness 
is an assumption. Regardless, notwithstanding their marked variability (or uniqueness) latent 
fingerprint examiners occasionally make mistakes – not identifying fingerprints that match 
(false negatives) and sometimes matching fingerprints from different sources (false 
positives). The asserted uniqueness of prints does not prevent fingerprint examiners from 
making mistakes. Claims about certainty and infallibility and the implications of fingerprints 
being unique (or appearing identical) are misguided. The more appropriate issues are the 
frequency of errors (especially false positives) made in similar conditions and the empirical 
insight into the frequency (and inter-relatedness) of features.63 This is why PCAST 
recommended that fingerprint examiners should provide an indicative error rate with their 
match decisions and should aim to develop probabilistic forms of expression and reporting – 
as with DNA profiling.64  
 The most recent of the scientific reviews, a gap analysis by the AAAS, concluded that 
historical over-claiming by latent fingerprint examiners would be difficult to correct: 
 
Public perceptions of latent print examination have undoubtedly been shaped by decades of 
overstatement. One of the problems that examiners now face when attempting to convey a more realistic 
and appropriate sense of the value of latent print evidence is that people generally think a reported 
association between a latent print and reference print constitutes a virtually infallible identification. In our 
view latent print examiners should take affirmative steps, when reporting their findings, to address these 
common misconceptions.65 
 
Courts, including Australian courts, would seem to be implicated in this state of affairs and 
consequently would seem to be obliged to assist in its remediation. 
 We might also note that latent fingerprint examiners did not identify the problems and 
have not pro-actively disclosed fundamental epistemological deficiencies. Indeed, rather than 
evaluate their procedures and abilities, most relied upon their (collective) impressions and 
experience, assumptions about uniqueness and its significance handed down by earlier 
generations of examiners, along with the accommodating responses of courts. Fingerprint 
examiners did not study their performance or go looking for errors or vulnerabilities. Most 
                                                        
60 I. Dror et al, ‘Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications’ (2006) 156 
Forensic Science International 74. 
61 NIST report; National Commission on Forensic Science, https://www.justice.gov/ncfs (accessed 1 June 2018). 
62 PCAST report, 61-2. See also NRC report, 145. 
63 Or, the frequency of similar features in other fingerprints, leading to some kind of probabilistic formulation. 
64 DNA profiling evidence is expressed in probabilistic terms but no error rate is included. 
65 AAAS report, 71. 
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fingerprint examiners and bureaus were not capable of undertaking the remedial validation 
work themselves. In the wake of the reviews they continued to report in categorical terms and 
were apparently satisfied by the alignment of their opinions with confessions, legal 
admission, and convictions. The problem with these and other forms of ‘evidence’ is that they 
are at best proxies.66 The correct answer – whether the prints are actually from the same 
source, and whether an error has been made – is usually unknown. Convictions, for example, 
may be driven by other evidence (often known to the examiner) and are not infrequently 
factually wrong.67  
 There are marked discrepancies between how latent fingerprint evidence is understood and 
used in criminal justice settings and how it is understood by attentive scientists. Importantly, 
legal institutions did not generate a sophisticated endogenous response to latent fingerprint 
(and other types of forensic science) evidence and, perhaps as troubling, appear to be resistant 
to contemporary scientific knowledge and authoritative scientific advice. Legal rules and 
procedures have never been interpreted in ways that direct attention to epistemic issues such 
as validity and scientific reliability. There is, for example, no expectation as a condition of 
admission, that fingerprint examiners will disclose empirically-derived error rates. 
 Scientific research provides a means of assessing legal responses to latent fingerprint 
evidence – past and present. This, as we shall see, is illuminating. The following study 
illustrates how no Australian court ever required latent fingerprint examiners to 
independently demonstrate their abilities or explain limitations and uncertainties – even when 
their opinion evidence was contested. There was no requirement to show that latent 
fingerprint evidence was valid and no consideration of its actual accuracy. There was no 
expectation that fingerprint examiners would present an indicative error rate. There was no 
attention to the existence of meaningful standards, on sufficiency, quality, agreement, the 
number of points required and so forth. No court, and this is very important, required latent 
fingerprint examiners to present their evidence in a way that was consistent with their known 
ability and in a form that would assist with rational evaluation (as opposed to deference). 
Courts allowed fingerprint examiners to positively identify persons without qualification or 
caveat. Courts also allowed latent fingerprint examiners to testify about their ‘method’ and 
‘the science’ – as in the example in Section 2 – in ways that were misguided, misleading and 
sometimes simply wrong. Police fingerprint examiners testified about their impressions and 
beliefs (what we might call fingerprint dogma) that was not based on scientific knowledge or 
consistent with what attentive scientists expected and recommend.68  
 
 
4. Admissibility assumed: Rex v Blacker (1910) and R v Parker (1912)  
Our survey begins at the close of the first decade of the twentieth century. By that stage 
fingerprint bureaus had already been established within most of the Australian police 
departments, and fingerprint evidence had already been used in investigations and criminal 
prosecutions.69 The first indication of an issue, for those reviewing the record, is the absence 
of a reported decision addressing (a challenge to) the admissibility of latent fingerprint 
evidence in Australia.70 The first two reported Australian cases, from NSW and Victoria, 
indicate how quickly the primary focus seems to have moved beyond any question of 
admissibility to practices surrounding the use of fingerprint evidence – specifically the use of 
                                                        
66 See Martire and Edmond, ‘Rethinking expert opinion evidence’. 
67 More problematically, decision makers rely on fingerprint evidence to convict and assess convictions on appeal. 
68 Australian courts relied heavily on examiners’ experience and earlier admissibility decisions. 
69 It was sometimes used to obtain confessions – or that is how police investigations were presented to the public. 
70 If there was a serious challenge at trial then it has not been remembered. Even R v Blacker [1910] SR (NSW) 357 
appears to have been quickly forgotten. There were quite a few investigations and prosecutions relying on fingerprint 
evidence reported in the major metropolitan newspapers in the decade preceding Blacker. 
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photographs and whether a fingerprint alone could support proof (of identity) beyond 
reasonable doubt. As in England and Wales (the first reported English decision is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix), in just a few short years the admissibility of latent fingerprint 
evidence seems to have been taken for granted by Australian courts. Though, the absence of 
sustained legal, and conspicuously appellate, engagement with the foundations is revealing 
when we appreciate that the validity and accuracy were not known (at that stage).71 
 The prosecution in R v Blacker followed a serious assault on a Chinese market gardener, 
the ransacking of his hut and the theft of cash from a box therein. A fingerprint on the cash 
box was matched to the thumb of Blacker. Using a ‘strong magnifier’ police sub-inspector 
Childs identified 14 points of similarity and opined that the print on the box was made by 
Blacker’s thumb.72 Blacker was tried and, on the basis of fingerprint evidence, convicted. The 
issue reserved in this case was whether enlarged photographs of the latent fingerprint and 
reference (or known) fingerprints from Blacker had been properly admitted. The defence 
challenged the admissibility of the particular enlargements on the ground that neither of the 
enlarged images captured the ‘whole’ of the latent or the reference print. Rather, they 
reproduced only that part of the print relied upon by Child for his comparison. Photographs of 
the full prints – that had not been enlarged – were admitted along with the partial 
enlargements. 
 On appeal, the Chief Justice of New South Wales had no doubt about the admissibility of 
the fingerprint evidence.73 
 
This new science of identification by fingerprints is based on experiments which show that the portion of 
the body most likely to be identified without probability of mistake is the bulbous portion of the thumb, 
and if similarity is found to exist the test is a very reliable one. In the present case the evidence of the 
expert showed that the similarity was sufficiently strong to justify the admission of evidence upon the 
point.74 
 
Upon inspection of the photographs, the Chief Justice and his colleagues were satisfied that 
the fingerprints were made by the same person.75 
 In relation to the partial enlargements, the Court accepted that ‘all the markings upon 
which the evidence as to the identification was based were represented’.76 The enlargements 
were necessary ‘to illustrate and explain what otherwise the jury could not see for 
themselves’ and to enable ‘the evidence of the expert … to be tested’.77 This required ‘the 
expert’ to ‘illustrate and explain what otherwise the jury could not see for themselves’ by 
‘something visible to the eye.’78 The omission of some surrounding markings, apparently 
blurred and not used for the comparison, was said to be immaterial in the absence of the 
defendant calling evidence to show that the portion used ‘was insufficient’ or not ‘accurately 
prepared under the supervision of the expert’.79 The Chief Justice insisted that the fingerprint 
evidence ‘was carefully given and thoroughly tested’. In particular, the jury was ‘very 
                                                        
71 If there are substantial challenges they are not reported. It would seem unlikely that serious challenges pass without 
record. 
72 R v Blacker [1910] SR (NSW) 357, 358. That is, ‘the two marks were made by the same thumb’. See also Blacker v 
The King (1910) 10 CLR 604, 605. 
73 Blacker, 360. 
74 Blacker, 360. (italics added) Neither the experiments nor evidence supporting the bulbous part of the thumb being of 
most use for comparison are referenced. 
75 This personal assessment appears inconsistent with R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 and Reg. v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 
676, discussed in Section 5.  
76 Blacker, 361. 
77 Blacker, 361. Contrast Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 167 (discussed below), where there is no requirement for the 
provision of images or the examiner’s markings. 
78 Blacker, 361. 
79 Blacker, 361-2. 
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carefully directed by the learned Judge as to the risk of error to which evidence of this class is 
open’ and ‘every precaution was taken to guard against any wrongful impression being 
conveyed to the jury’.80 
 The appeal in R v Parker generated a more detailed appellate response to issues attending 
the introduction of fingerprint evidence. Though, once again, it had ‘not been suggested that 
this evidence was wrongly admitted’. The appeal in Parker is concerned with the value of the 
evidence and the ability of a single latent fingerprint to support criminal proof.81 Parker is 
exceptional, among our sample, because notwithstanding the majority finding the fingerprint 
evidence admissible and compelling, the Chief Justice of Victoria voiced a forceful dissent. 
 Parker was convicted of breaking into a warehouse and stealing jewelry from a safe. A 
latent fingerprint was obtained from a bottle of ginger beer located adjacent to the safe. A 
photograph of the latent print as well as a photograph of Parker’s middle fingerprint were 
both enlarged and admitted at trial. Detective Potter, in charge of the fingerprint identification 
branch, gave evidence about the resemblance and ‘pointed out to the jury nine points of 
similarity’ as well as scars said to appear in both images.82 His evidence was summarised as 
follows:  
 
… he was of opinion that the prisoner’s finger must have made the print on the bottle. He had examined 
tens of thousands of finger-prints, and never found two alike. The markings on a person’s fingers remain 
the same through life. Inspector Child, of the New South Wales police, gave evidence to the same effect. 
No two individuals had the same finger-prints.83  
 
The jury convicted, the Court of Appeal was asked to consider: ‘[w]hen the only evidence 
against an accused person depends upon the resemblance between finger-prints … whether 
such evidence is sufficient to support a conviction?’84 
 Three judges considered this question and two found that it could. In reflecting on 
fingerprint evidence, Justice Hodges considered that in terms of identification, and in 
comparison to eyewitness evidence, fingerprints: 
 
would be the strongest, the most satisfactory, and the most conclusive proof of identity that could be 
produced, and therefore … finger-print evidence of identity may be undoubtedly sufficient to justify the 
conviction of the accused.85 
 
He continued,  
 
In my opinion, it may be the safest of all evidence, as it does not depend upon the impressions caused by 
a momentary glance, but the impression is put on record, and the jury can see and judge for themselves as 
to the identity of the finger-marks and the expert be merely a help to enable the jury to use the evidence 
of their own eyes.86 
 
In terms of the respective role of fingerprint examiner and jury, provided the jury ‘were 
satisfied with the witness under examination and cross-examination to arrive at the 
conclusion’ for Hodges ‘that was sufficient to justify a conviction.’87 
                                                        
80 Blacker, 360. 
81 Compare DNA only prosecutions. See A. Ligertwood, ‘Can DNA Evidence Alone Convict an Accused?’ (2011) 33 
Sydney Law Review 487. 
82 Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681, 682. We can see observe claims about permanence and uniqueness, mobilized 
as though they provide a warrant for individualisation. 
83 R v Parker [1912] VR 152, 153. 
84 Parker, 156-157. 
85 Parker, 158. 
86 Parker, 158. 
87 Parker, 159: Though, because Hodges had neither seen nor heard the cross-examination he would not say ‘whether … 
I would have agreed’ with the result. 
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 In his concurrence, Justice Cussen explained: ‘[i]t now seems that this much is 
established—that there is a very high degree of probability that a finger-print corresponding 
with that of the prisoner was made by his finger’.88 There was no requirement that the 
fingerprint evidence be corroborated by another class of evidence, and so he affirmed the 
conviction. Cussen drew support from two English cases, namely R v Castleton and another, 
along with R v Rudiwick (an unreported Victorian case), and the appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Illinois in People v Jennings.89 Justice Cussen’s decision seems to suggest that with respect 
to similarities between fingerprints, examiners ‘are not, in one sense, speaking as experts … 
but merely pointing out to the jury matters which they jury could determine for themselves.’ 
In his words examiners ‘are simply convenient helpers of the Court.’90 (Questions around the 
division of responsibility between experts and juries would be an ongoing issue for Australian 
courts). 
 In a spirited dissent Chief Justice Madden adverted to the ‘extreme danger’ of allowing 
fingerprint evidence to satisfy criminal proof. 
 
The extreme danger of arriving at such a conclusion warrants me in not deferring to their opinions. We 
are asked to accept the theory that the correspondence between two sets of finger-prints is conclusive 
evidence of the identity of the person who made those prints as an established scientific fact, standing on 
the same basis as the proposition of Euclid or other matters vouched for by science and universally 
accepted as proved. If this finger-print theory were generally recognized by scientific men as standing on 
this basis, there would be no more to be said. It is said that the markings on the fingers of any individual 
retain their special characteristics from the cradle to the grave, and also that the markings on the fingers 
of no two individuals are the same, so that absolute correspondence between a finger-print and the 
markings on a man’s hand is unmistakable evidence that he is the person who made such print. 
 My difficulty arises from the fact that the subject of finger-prints has not been sufficiently studied to 
enable these propositions to be laid down as scientific facts. Finger-prints have been studied by Monsieur 
Bertillon in France from an anthropometrical point of view, and by Sir Francis Galton and a few others, 
doubtless highly intelligent persons, from the standpoint of mere observers. But the matter has not been 
investigated by scientists generally so that we can say that the propositions relied on by the Crown are 
accepted scientific facts.91 
 
For Madden, the evidence also raised issues of honesty and trust that threatened to undermine 
legal safeguards. He referred to being dependent on the ‘ipse dixit’ of the examiner: How 
could the cross-examiner or jury assess whether among the 29 000 sets of prints purportedly 
examined by the witness that there were ‘no two alike’.92 And, vitally, how could his 
evidence be ‘tested’? 
 
… when the detectives swear that no two men’s finger-prints could possibly be alike, I think that that is 
apt to be accepted by the jury, who have no personal knowledge to test it by …93 
 
The Chief Justice was not personally satisfied that ‘there is any marked similarity’ between 
the images of the latent fingerprint and Parker’s fingerprint.94 In the process he characterised 
the English Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Castleton as ‘most unsatisfactory’, noted that 
those who had bought and delivered the ginger beer were not called, and the possibility that 
                                                        
88 Parker, 161. The judge speaks in terms of probabilities. 
89 See R v Rudiwick (Argus 11 December 1909, p.18) (listed as Charles Rudebeck); R v Castleton [1909] 3 Cr App R 
74; a case cited in Taylors Medical Jurisprudence (1910 ed.) vol. I, p.127 [to be confirmed] and People v Jennings, 252 
III. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911). 
90 Parker, 160.  
91 Parker, 154. See J. Ellenbogen, Reasoned and Unreasoned Images: The Photography of Bertillon, Galton, and Marey 
(Penn State University Press, 2013). 
92 Parker, 154. This term reappears in Kumho Tire Co. Ltd v Carmichael 526 U.S. 127 (1999). 
93 Parker, 155. 
94 Parker, 155. 
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the prisoner had innocently touched the bottle had not been excluded (by the prosecutor). The 
Chief Justice was of the opinion that the case should have been withdrawn from the jury. 
 Despite the split in the Court, all three judges questioned the claim about the individuality 
(or uniqueness) attributed to fingerprints. They agreed that ‘the statement made by the expert 
witnesses that there could not be two finger-prints alike should not have been admitted, 
because … their knowledge or the knowledge of anyone else on the subject does not profess 
to be based on any universal law, but is merely empirical’.95 That is, it was based on personal 
experience. Justice Hodges did not think it ‘necessary to say that there could not be any other 
finger-mark in the world like it’ and agreed ‘with what the learned Chief Justice has said as to 
the admissibility of that piece of evidence.’96 Justice Cussen indicated that fingerprint 
examiners might identify differences (for exclusionary purposes), but as far as similarities 
were concerned they could merely point these out to the jury for their consideration.97 The 
headnote in the Argus Law Reports summarised the Courts’ position in the following terms: 
 
Semble, per Curiam,—Evidence by experts that no two finger-prints can be identical is not admissible as 
being the statement of a scientific fact based upon a universal law. 98 
 
 Blacker and Parker each sought review by the High Court of Australia. Both requests were 
refused. During the oral application in Blacker, counsel raised the issue of the enlargement of 
part of the fingerprint and the possibility that ‘the portion omitted might have shown the 
prints were dissimilar.’ The issue was left hanging.99 The High Court appeared to accept the 
claim that ‘if within a small radius around the bulb certain characteristics were found to 
coincide, that would identify the print irrespective of the outlying portions’.100 Chief Justice 
Griffith suggested that if enlargements were not admissible ‘you might as well object to a 
witness using a microscope’.101 Justice Isaacs indicated that the enlargement of one part of 
the print ‘goes to the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.’102 
 Subsequently, dismissing the application in Parker, Griffiths drew an analogy between 
fingerprints and signatures.103 
 
Signatures have been accepted as evidence of identity as long as they have been used. The fact of the 
individuality of the corrugations of the skin on the fingers of the human hand is now so generally 
recognized as to require very little, if any, evidence of it, although it seems to be still the practice to 
offer some expert evidence on the point. A finger print is therefore in reality an unforgeable 
signature. That is now recognized in a large part of the world, and in some parts has, I think, been 
recognized for many centuries. It is certainly now generally recognized in England and other parts of 
the British Dominions.104 
 
Notwithstanding concerns in the Court of Appeal, the individuality (or uniqueness) of 
fingerprints is here presented as notorious. The High Court seems to have been satisfied about 
‘the individuality of the corrugations of the skin on the fingers’. 
                                                        
95 Parker, Madden CJ at 155, Cossens J at 159, and Hodges J at 158. 
96 Parker, 158. 
97 Parker, 161. This seems similar to the approach to image interpretation subsequently adopted in R v Tang (2006) 65 
NSWLR 681. 
98 Rex v Parker in The Argus Law Reports, Vol. xviii (14 May 1912). 
99 Blacker v The King (1910) 10 CLR 604, 606. 
100 Blacker, 605. 
101 Blacker, 606. This statement seems to conflate the issue of enlargement, live in the application for leave, with the 
separate issue of the validity and accuracy of latent fingerprint comparison. 
102 Blacker, 606. 
103 Counsel questioned whether Castleton was authority for fingerprint only conviction. 
104 Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681, 683 (per Griffith CJ). 
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 Blacker and Parker were not admissibility challenges, per se. Though they support 
implicitly, the admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence. Following Blacker and Parker 
fingerprints were not only admissible, but in cases where identity was in issue fingerprint 
evidence alone could sustain proof beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
 
5. A century of consolidation: Routine reliance and non-epistemic challenges  
Between 1910 and the first of the scientific reviews published in 2009, the admissibility and 
use of fingerprint evidence was challenged in Australian courts in a variety of ways. Reported 
challenges were not directed at the validity and accuracy of latent fingerprints, the absence of 
(empirically-based) standards, the categorical identifications, cognitive bias and so on. The 
history of challenges to latent fingerprint evidence is dominated by legal issues, such as: 
compliance with procedures for obtaining reference fingerprints;105 the use of fingerprints 
obtained when the defendant was a minor;106 the ability to obtain prints from a minor;107 
whether adequate caution was given;108 whether the disclosure (or implication) of previous 
offences, through the existence of a fingerprint record, was unfair to the defendant at trial;109 
the hearsay implications of fingerprints on a document;110 whether prints could sustain proof 
in particular cases (following Parker);111 the appropriate judicial directions for the jury when 
fingerprint evidence was in issue;112 and whether the jury could compare the fingerprints 
themselves.113  
 Perhaps the most sustained question concerns these last issues – the respective roles of 
fingerprint examiners, judges and juries in the evaluation of the fingerprint evidence.114 In 
Blacker (and Castleton) the Court of Appeal seems to have been satisfied that the latent 
fingerprints were those of the appellant on the basis of its own examination. The issue also 
rose in Parker, and more prominently later in the century in R v Lawless and R v 
O’Callaghan.115 
 Lawless was convicted of murder on the basis of circumstantial eyewitness evidence and a 
latent fingerprint found on a cigarette packet recovered from the crime scene. He accused the 
police of planting the cigarette packet.116 The Crown conceded that the fingerprint evidence 
in this particular case was insufficient on its own to prove guilt. On appeal Lawless 
questioned the way the latent fingerprint evidence was presented to the jury. The trial judge 
had indicated that the jury would not be provided with a magnifying (or ‘Hendry’) glass: 
 
                                                        
105 R v Delgado-Guerra; ex parte Attorney-General, [2002] 2 Qd R 384; Director of Public Prosecutions v Morrison, 
[1993] 1 VR 573 (consent); Carr v The Queen (1973) 127 CLR 662; Boski v Biffin [2015] NSWSC 363; Watkins v 
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the jury would not be allowed to carry out such an experimentation as it was an expert field of 
knowledge, and the accused would have to contest the witness’s evidence with expert evidence or 
suggest to the jury that he should not be believed, but the jury could not set themselves up as experts.117 
 
The trial judge charged the jury in the following terms: 
 
It is, of course, entirely a matter for you to judge and examine his evidence and to make up your own 
minds as to whether you are satisfied with it and satisfied that he is accurate and honest, reliable, both in 
the investigation he made of the print and in the opinion that he expressed that it belonged to the accused 
man.118 
 
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the trial judge’s actions were appropriate and did not 
interfere with the prerogatives of the jury (or encourage them to become experts): 
 
We are of the opinion that the judge was right in his intervention. It is a matter for expertise not 
possessed by the ordinary run of mankind to identify characteristics of fingerprints and their patterns in 
each of two prints and make a comparison and form a conclusion as to whether they are identical or not 
and the jury could not be invited or allowed to act as experts. That is not to say of course that the jury 
could be prevented from examining the exhibits for the purpose of determining whether they were 
satisfied to the necessary degree by the evidence of the witness. The determination was for them, but the 
provision of evidence was for the experts.119 
 
 In O’Callaghan the fingerprint evidence was challenged on the ground that the jury was 
invited to undertake its own analysis of the fingerprints. The O’Callaghan court endorsed 
Lawless: ‘when properly understood there is no conflict between what was said in Lawless 
and the decision in Parker.’120 Both Lawless and Parker were said to ‘make it plain that it is 
for the jury to decide whether one set of fingerprints is the same as another.’121 The Court 
explained that it ‘may be misleading to say that it is for the expert to form a conclusion 
whether two prints are identical but his Honour made it clear that the determination of the 
question of fact was for the jury and that they had to consider whether they were satisfied 
with the expert evidence.’122 
 The Court of Appeal was also asked to consider the admission of the following testimony:  
 
Under cross-examination the expert said: “I have never been proved wrong on fingerprint identification, 
but the problem is it takes five years to train a fingerprint man, and members of the jury can see 
something in a fingerprint which they would consider makes it not in when in fact it is in.” He was led 
into repeating and re-affirming his view that the impressions shown in Exhibits “B” and “C” were 
identical. Then after a lengthy cross-examination this question was put to him: “Would you go so far as 
to say that there are not and never have been any two prints which are the same as each other?” to which 
he replied, “I will, yes.” Not content with that answer counsel persisted and finally these questions and 
answers were asked and given “You would say that never in the history of the world has there been a 
person born with the same fingerprint as somebody else? - From my studying of text books and the 
findings of other as you call scientists, and from my own examination of ridge characteristics occurring 
in fingerprints I have examined, I would say most emphatically no. “I take it you go a step further and 
say it is just not possible for such a thing to occur? - I would say yes, unless that impression was made by 
the same finger.”123 
 
                                                        
117 Lawless, 422. 
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122 O’Callaghan, 679. See also R v Dearing, Kenneth George [1975] VicSC 37, 17-20 (19 February 1975). 
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Rather than treat some of these answers as impermissible, following the prohibition in Parker 
(and later R v Ghebrat), and perhaps consider the implications for the probative value (in 
relation to underlying methodological issues, about validity, errors and the significance of 
uniqueness) and the credibility of the witness, the fact that they were asked by defence 
counsel meant that, for the Court of Appeal, leave should not have been given to raise 
them.124 To the extent that these answers, made in the absence of scientific support (and 
against appellate prohibition), are received at trial, responsibility is attributed to the 
defence.125 Cross-examination is consistently presented, across the fingerprint cases, as an 
effective trial safeguard. However, when questions lead to ignorant, exaggerated and 
misleading answers, from an expert witness called by the state, the defence is blamed.126  
 A handful of further appeals questioned the opinions of latent fingerprint examiners where 
opinions extended beyond match decisions (conventionally restricted to identity or source) to 
the activity associated with deposition of a latent fingerprint or the age of a print.127 In 
Hillstead v The Queen, the fingerprint examiner testified that fingerprints in blood were 
deposited contemporaneously with a bloody murder. This testimony, presented without 
qualification or support, was judged to have been improper – ipse dixit that trespassed beyond 
the scope of legally-recognisable fingerprint expertise.128 The appeal in Regina v SMR was 
dismissed notwithstanding the examiner having offered an opinion about the age of a latent 
fingerprint on a library book, in circumstances where the trial judge did not appropriately 
address the limitations.129 Expertise in fingerprint comparison for purposes of assisting with 
identification is not known to extend to the age of a print or the activity being engaged in 
when the latent print was deposited.130 Even in Mickelberg v The Queen, a series of wrongful 
convictions involving serious police malfeasance that took decades to unravel, concern with 
the latent fingerprint evidence was directed to whether it was planted or a forgery.131 The 
reliability of identification by latent fingerprint comparison was taken-for-granted 
throughout, only the intervention of dishonest investigators threatened its integrity. 
 Overall, the reliability (and probative value) of identification by latent fingerprint 
comparison appears unquestionable and, significantly, remains unquestioned. We can observe 
continuity in recently reported decisions where Australian courts demonstrate an abiding 
confidence in fingerprint evidence and find that it is so self-evidently reliable that there is no 
particular need for proponents to disclose materials, identify assumptions or explain the 
method. The appeals in Bennett v Police, discussed immediately below, might even suggest 
liberalization and complacency, as common law judges no longer expect the state – as they 
had in Blacker and Parker – to provide photographic evidence, identify points of similarity or 
explain how the identification was made. 
 Bennett was identified when a fingerprint located following a break-in was described by a 
fingerprint examiner as ‘identical to a fingerprint taken from Mr Bennett’ and ‘from the same 
person’.132 At trial the examiner testified as follows: ‘[w]hen I say that something is identical, 
what I mean is that the impressions were made by the one person excluding all others.’133 
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Bennett was convicted. On appeal, there was no dispute about the examiner being ‘qualified 
to express the opinion that he gave.’134 The judgment insists that there was ‘no suggestion 
that the process of comparison that he followed is not a recognised and appropriate 
process.’135 Rather, Bennett’s counsel complained that the examiner had not supplied images 
or specified the features he observed. He had, in addition, made no contemporaneous notes.136 
This meant, according to the defence, that it was not in a position to determine the facts on 
which the opinion was based and so was incapable of evaluating the opinion (and any 
reasoning) prior to the proceedings.137  
 On appeal, Chief Justice Doyle explained that admissibility was not affected by the ability 
‘to describe in detail what the witness observed, or to produce an image or representation of 
what the witness observed’.138 ‘It was permissible’, for the examiner, ‘to say that identical 
features were found, without itemizing them.’139 Oversights and omissions were cast as issues 
for weight.140 The defence was characterised as having ‘had the fullest opportunity to cross-
examine’ the witness.141 Moreover, the failure of the defence to ask for images and cross-
examine on them, was a factor Doyle thought ought to be taken into consideration in 
assessing the merit of the appeal.142 In the end, the Chief Justice was satisfied with the 
admission of the evidence and the safety of the conviction because of ‘unchallenged evidence 
that each fingerprint exhibited features that, taken together, led to the conclusion that they 
were identical.’143 It was not considered ‘unfair, in a case like this, to leave it to counsel to 
cross-examine [the examiner] about the features on which he relied.’144  
 The decision was upheld on a further appeal to the full court. On the issue of jury 
comparisons, Acting Chief Justice Perry wrote: ‘[i]dentification of similarities in fingerprints 
is a highly technical matter requiring considerable expertise and experience. I have regularly 
instructed juries not to attempt to make such as comparison themselves.’145 This seems to be 
a succinct summary of the conventional position following Lawless and O’Callaghan (after 
Hodges in Parker). 
 The leading judgment in the full court provides a description of the comparison from the 
trial.  
 
In making a comparison between the images of the negatives and in this case the unknown, and the 
known print on the ink set, it’s a matter of comparing the impressions or the characteristics which appear 
in the image on the negative against the characteristics as they appear in sequence and by looking at the 
flow of the ridges, the quality of the impressions, an opinion may be formed.146 
 
This is a caricature of the ‘method’. On appeal, the fact that the examiner had not proactively 
explained his method or produced the photographs, mark-ups or notes, was again challenged 
on the basis that ‘the factual basis [of the opinion] had not been established’.147 It was said to 
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be unfair because ‘it was not possible … to test the opinion without access to the information 
upon which the comparisons had been made.’148 
  Once again, the full court deemed the absence of photographs as a matter for weight.149 
The Court characterised the defence position as strategic: ‘a forensic choice not to ask for 
production of the image’. As for the factual foundations and the method, the Full Court found 
that the ‘evidence was admissible’.150 
 
… the expert had not been challenged as to his expertise, his expertise had clearly been established, the 
methodology that he used generally in the comparison of fingerprints was explained to the Court [see the 
previous extract], the defence called no evidence to the contrary, and the expert gave evidence that he 
found the comparison showed that the fingerprints were identical.151 
 
We might note that there are no references to ACE-V, validation, standards, error rates, 
human factors, or scientific research in the decision. 
 In Parker and Blacker courts referred to the need for the jury to see the photographs of the 
prints. All of the judges in Parker were critical, and against the admission, of claims about 
uniqueness and therefore, though perhaps implicitly, positive identification (to the exclusion 
of all other persons).152 A century later, in Bennett, positive identification is not questioned 
and there is apparently no need for the examiner or prosecutor to produce images, explain the 
basis of the decision, refer to points of similarity, or even address apparent differences or 
distortion.153  
 It is not my intention to trivialise these legal (or non-epistemic) challenges. Rather, these 
examples illustrate how lawyers and courts have taken the reliability of latent fingerprint 
evidence – in its strongest form, as positive evidence of identity – for granted. A handful of 
the challenges focused on legal and procedural issues were successful and probably 
represented the most effective way of advancing the particular client’s interest within the 
existing paradigm. These cases, however, suggest that lawyers and judges credulously 
accepted (or were unwilling or unable to question) assertions, advanced by fingerprint 
examiners and accepted by earlier courts, about latent fingerprint evidence being effectively 
infallible evidence of identity based on the uniqueness of human fingerprints. The 
overwhelming concern with legal rather than epistemological issues seems to be the result of 
legal beliefs – informed by both tradition and personal beliefs – in conjunction with a 
conspicuous lack of technical sophistication. 
 
6. Royal Commissions, new evidence rules and new technologies 
A series of prominent mistakes involving forensic science evidence, notably Splatt and 
Chamberlain and, more recently, prominent appeals in cases such as Mallard v The Queen, 
Wood v R, R v Gilham and R v Keogh have exerted no discernible impact on the processing 
and reporting of latent fingerprint evidence.154 At the time of the Royal Commission into the 
                                                        
148 Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415, [23]. Drawing upon Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) NSWLR 705. 
See also JP, below. 
149 Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415, [30]. 
150 Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415, [31]. 
151 Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415, [32]. Here certification and vague description of method stand in for actual 
ability and override the need for appropriate presentation. 
152 These are the same, even if they are not always represented or understood as such. If fingerprint examiners believe 
fingerprints are unique, then they are presenting a match as individualisation. 
153 Blacker, 361: The enlargements were necessary ‘to illustrate and explain what otherwise the jury could not see for 
themselves’ and to enable ‘the evidence of the expert … to be tested’. Contrast Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 167 
(discussed below), where there is no requirement for the provision of images or the examiner’s markings. 
154 Justice Morling, Royal Commission of inquiry into the Chamberlain Convictions (1987); C. Shannon, Royal 
Commission of Inquiry in Respect to the Case of Edward Charles Splatt (Government Printer, Adelaide, 1984); Mallard 
v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125; Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim 
 22 
Chamberlain convictions the various Australian jurisdictions were, like other advanced nation 
states, reforming their latent fingerprint operations through the introduction of computer-
based systems for collection, storage and searching. Dramatic changes to the collection, 
storage, searching and comparison of fingerprints facilitated by the introduction of electronic 
databases, search algorithms, and electronic programs to facilitate comparison do not appear 
to have generated interest from lawyers or judges. Even the introduction of new evidence 
rules – specifically the Uniform Evidence Law (UEL) from 1995 – that included an 
admissibility standard for expert opinion evidence loosely modeled on r702 of the US Federal 
Rules of Evidence (1975) exerted no discernible impact on the reception and presentation of 
latent fingerprint (or other forensic science) evidence.155 
 
A. New rules of evidence and procedure 
Prior to 1995, almost all of the challenges to latent fingerprint evidence were based on 
common law rules of evidence and a range of statutes regulating the collection, storage and 
use of latent fingerprints. Since 1995, beginning with the Commonwealth (federal courts) and 
New South Wales, several Australian jurisdictions introduced new evidence legislation. 
Influenced by the Federal Rules of Evidence (US), these rules were slowly adopted by a 
majority (though not all) of the states and territories. One reason why forensic science 
evidence has not received more sustained consideration is the formal rejection, in the most 
populous jurisdictions (NSW and Victoria), of ‘reliability’ as an admissibility requirement.156 
Unlike the US Supreme Court – in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Kumho 
Tire Co v Carmichael – Australian courts have been unwilling to read the need for validation 
and reliability into the requirement that opinions must be wholly or substantially based on 
‘specialised knowledge’ – under s79(1) of the UEL.157 Writing for the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Tang, Chief Justice Spigelman insisted that ‘the focus of 
attention must be on the words “specialised knowledge”, not on the introduction of an 
extraneous idea such as “reliability”.’158 That s79(1) ‘is not concerned with reliability of the 
expert’s opinions’ was recently confirmed in Chen v R.159 This disinterest in reliability was 
endorsed by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Tuite, and the High Court has been 
unwilling to provide meaningful guidance on the application of s79(1) to forensic science 
evidence.160 
 When expert opinion evidence is contested Australian courts subject to the UEL are 
required to confirm that expert opinions are based on ‘specialised knowledge’ and that the 
specialised knowledge is based on ‘training, study or experience’. Expert reports (and 
testimony) are expected to make it possible for courts to determine whether contested opinion 
satisfies these admissibility conditions.161  However, when dealing with latent fingerprint 
evidence Australian courts, whether applying the UEL or the common law (as in Bennett), 
have asked very little of latent fingerprint examiners. The judges in JP v DPP and R v Parry 
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(both considered below) relied on the following passage from Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar 
conferring some kind of exemption or ‘short cut’.162 
 
The way in which s 79(1) is drafted necessarily makes the description of these requirements very long. 
But that is not to say that the requirements cannot be met in many, perhaps most, cases very quickly and 
easily. That a specialist medical practitioner expressing a diagnostic opinion in his or her relevant field of 
specialisation is applying ‘specialised knowledge’ based on his or her ‘training, study or experience’, 
being an opinion ‘wholly or substantially based’ on that ‘specialised knowledge’, will require little 
explicit articulation or amplification once the witness has described his or her qualifications and 
experience, and has identified the subject matter about which the opinion is proffered.” (emphasis 
added)163 
 
They also drew on the appeal in R v Tang (an image comparison case) for support specifically 
in relation to latent fingerprint evidence. There the Court of Criminal Appeal stated:  
 
By long usage, expert evidence is given in the form of an opinion that the fingerprint of the accused is the 
same as that from the crime scene. Such an opinion is based on the cumulative effect of a number of 
points of similarity, each of which is itself an expression of opinion.164 
 
Chief Justice Spigelman provided this legal rationalisation, confirming the admissibility of 
categorical identifications based on points of similarity – long after the English and most 
Australian fingerprint bureaus had formally abandoned point systems.165 This explanation 
bears little resemblance to available scientific knowledge and advice.166 Importantly, the 
‘short cut’ referred to in Dasreef (and Tang), was not intended to exempt evidence from 
compliance with admissibility rules.167 Rather, it suggests that some types of evidence 
obviously satisfy the conditions. The problem is that this ‘exemption’ has discouraged 
challenges – focused on ‘specialised knowledge’ – even when appropriate scientific 
evaluation has not been undertaken. 
 Another explanation for the failure to consider validity and scientific reliability is the 
proscription on trial judges considering the reliability of evidence or the credibility of the 
witness when balancing the probative value against unfair prejudice under s137 of the 
UEL.168 Unlike most other advanced common law jurisdictions, Australia does not require 
the proponent of scientific and technical evidence to demonstrate reliability as a condition of 
admission. The reliability of evidence plays no role in Australian admissibility jurisprudence 
and practice.169 The upshot is that limitations, uncertainties and risks are left for the trial and 
ultimately the tribunal of fact. Australian courts appear to place extreme confidence in trial 
safeguards. 
 Tort reform at the turn of the millennium, flowing from empirically tenuous concerns 
about the performance of civil justice systems, led to the introduction of codes of conduct for 
expert witnesses to supplement rules of evidence.170 Revealingly, these were originally 
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restricted to civil proceedings and only extended to criminal proceedings in the years 
following as something of an afterthought.171 These new codes made the expectations on 
expert witness explicit. Not only were witnesses required to act impartiality, codes explained 
that their overriding duty was to the court. In addition to these explicit behavioural 
expectations, codes listed the minimum requirements for expert reports. They require experts 
to: identify the factual bases of opinions; describe the process and any equipment used; 
explain the reasoning; identify limitations and uncertainties; refer to literatures; describe tests 
that have (or have not) been undertaken and qualifications that are necessary, and so on. In 
principle, expert reports should provide enough information to place a reader in a position to 
rationally evaluate the opinion and for the trial judge to determine admissibility (should the 
evidence be challenged).172 Until very recently, most latent fingerprint reports were just a 
couple of pages in length. Most simply reported matches and declared that they were in 
accord with any jurisdictional procedural requirements even when flagrantly non-
compliant.173  
 It is remarkable, as authoritative criticism and scientific research began to emerge, that the 
state’s latent fingerprint examiners elected not to disclose any of it. It was not until criticism 
of grossly deficient reporting was formally raised by defence counsel in JP v DPP in 2015 
that the NSW Forensic Group began to revise its reporting template. This group had been 
aware of the NRC, NIST and Fingerprint Inquiry reports for years.174 Many of the templates 
in use by state-employed fingerprint examiners remain non-compliant. They are inconsistent 
with what we might expect from impartial experts.175 Codes (and the more recent Practice 
Note from Victoria) may not be rules of admissibility, per se, but judges have been very 
quick to excuse non-compliance in circumstances where the defendant was not in a position 
to understand what was done (and by whom), the value of the opinion, and was not referred 
to the existence of the growing chorus of mainstream scientific research and criticism.176 
 
B. Technological innovation, training and personnel 
The paucity – really absence – of epistemological challenges prior to JP v DPP is all the 
more curious because there were dramatic changes to the way latent fingerprints were 
collected, processed, stored, searched and analysed across the course of the twentieth century. 
Originally, collection involved tape lifts, wet photography and often times the removal and 
examination of objects that had been touched. Examination relied on naked eyes and 
magnifying glasses – such as the Hendry glass discussed in Lawless. Reference prints were 
collected from suspects (often informally, as in Blacker). Though card records rapidly 
expanded as systems were designed to obtain and classify print features for the purposes of 
searching.177 By the end of the century, there were a range of new techniques in use, some 
involving the use of chemicals and lighting to locate and enhance the visibility of latent prints 
on a wide range of surfaces.178 While latent prints continue to be lifted, most are now 
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captured by digital camera and stored electronically.179 Prints are routinely manipulated, 
enhanced and shared using specialised computer programs, and proprietary algorithms enable 
rapid searching of massive electronic databases. Notwithstanding these developments, there 
are few reported references to new visualization, searching and evaluation technologies. 
Legal references to state based databases (AFIS) and the National Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (NAFIS) tend to be both recent and perfunctory.180  
 Toward the end of the twentieth century ACE-V emerged as the dominant ‘method’ used 
by latent fingerprint examiners. Though, the term appears in few of the decisions reported on 
Westlaw and Austlii and was not a regular feature in NSW police fingerprint reports before 
they were revised following the challenge in JP v DPP.181 Adoption of ACE-V as ‘the 
method’ did not resolve inconsistencies around standards. Similarly, prior to formal adoption 
of ACE-V, bureaus and departments tended to focus on a minimum number of points of 
similarity before they were prepared to report a match.182 Most bureaus formally abandoned 
point systems before the end of the twentieth century. Curiously, there are no reported 
decisions discussing the number of points required for an identification (although consider 
the allusion by the trial judge in Ghebrat in Section 7), even after scientists engaged by the 
Home Office (UK) reported that the point standards were not based on scientific research.183 
Recall that Inspector Childs purported to identify 14 points of similarity in Blacker and 
Detective Potter referred to 9 points in Parker. 
 The organisation of fingerprint bureaus and the training of examiners also changed 
markedly during the course of the twentieth century and beyond.184 The tiny groups that 
formed in the first decades of the twentieth century were consolidated and expanded in police 
departments and investigative agencies. Simultaneously, training became more formalized 
from the 1920s and 1930s. In some jurisdictions, notably those influenced by England, 
training took years as examiners were slowly socialized into fingerprint bureaus and their 
dogma.185 Historically, most latent fingerprint examiners were police officers. Very few 
possessed tertiary qualifications. In more recent years, many police departments have begun 
to employ civilians with tertiary qualifications in forensic science or the sciences.  
 In parallel to the expansion of fingerprint bureaus and the routinisation of fingerprint 
evidence for identification, all Australian jurisdictions enacted legislation that enabled 
investigators to collect the fingerprints of suspects and store and search those of convicted 
offenders. This legislation tended to become more permissive, gradually expanding the 
groups whose fingerprints could be legally collected, stored, searched and shared across state 
and national borders. Ambiguities and omissions in this enabling legislation – manifesting 
through alleged breaches of procedures and rights – provided some of the main means of 
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contesting latent fingerprint evidence at trial and on appeal. As we saw in Section 5, these 
represent a considerable portion of the reported historical challenges.186 
 It is not surprising that lawyers focused on legal issues in their attempts to challenge the 
admissibility and use of fingerprint evidence. What is remarkable, however, is how few of the 
challenges questioned traditional practices and commitments, ACE-V, revised procedures, 
new technologies, and the profound epistemic pretensions of positive identification (to the 
exclusion of all others) and claims of a zero error rate. 
 
 
7. ‘fading palimpsest’: The only epistemological challenge in Australian history 
This final empirical section offers a glimpse of the way our courts are responding to the 
emerging scientific findings.187 Judicial responses, to some extent ongoing, exhibit 
inexplicably disengaged, quiescent and even sceptical responses to mainstream scientific 
research and advice. This section helps us to understand how the exceptional 
epistemologically-sophisticated challenge may be effectively erased from legal institutional 
memory and collective experience.188 Our courts have been remarkably insensitive to the 
evidentiary and institutional implications of scientific knowledge. 
 
A. Ghebrat v R (2011) and JP v DPP (2015) 
Two recent appeals raise issues associated with the NRC and the other reports, namely 
Ghebrat v R and JP v DPP.189 It is unclear whether defence counsel in Ghebrat was 
conversant with the NRC report – it is not cited in the reported decision – but two of the 
issues raised on appeal overlap with issues identified by the NRC and other reports. JP is of a 
different order. There, trial counsel was aware of the scientific reports and sought to use them 
to impugn the state’s evidence in a fingerprint-only prosecution. JP appears to be the only 
time that an Australian court has been exposed to the scientific research summarised in 
Section 3. 
 Ghebrat was convicted of robbing a liquor store. One of three latent fingerprints recovered 
from a large whisky bottle touched during the robbery was matched to his fingerprint. Among 
the issues on appeal were the significance of this match – given that Ghebrat had previously 
visited the store as a customer – and the way the fingerprint evidence was explained to the 
jury by the trial judge. Of particular concern were the failure to convey the potentially 
innocent explanation for the presence of the print, the implications of the two unmatched 
latent fingerprints, and the level of certainty associated with the identification. On the level of 
certainty, the Court of Appeal explained that the fingerprint evidence and trial judge’s 
explanation to the jury seemed to suggest that once a sufficient number of points of similarity 
were obtained, the identification evidence was effectively certain. This was criticised. For, 
while the fingerprint examiner had positively identified Ghebrat and ‘denied that error had 
occurred in this case’ the contention that it ‘established certainty’ was, for the Court of 
Appeal, ‘not supported by the evidence.’190 The appellant’s counsel appears to have also 
raised the issue of cognitive bias, and pointed to the advantages of ‘blind’ verification; but 
these are mentioned in the judgment only in passing.191 The Court of Appeal found, in 
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addition, that the trial judge should not have admitted hearsay evidence about the result of the 
‘verification’ stage from ACE-V. The Court ordered a re-trial. Ghebrat seems to have, 
unwittingly, resurrected anxiety about uniqueness and its implications expressed all those 
years ago by the same court in Parker.192 
 Perhaps the most interesting feature of Ghebrat is that the decision is critical of the trial 
judge’s failure to adequately summarise the evidence on the ‘process and the risk of 
mistake’.193 The trial judge said the following in the charge to the jury: 
 
If the characteristics of the two patterns of fingerprint samples have been found to match at a sufficient 
number of points, it is possible to say with certainty that the samples came from the same person and if 
you accept that, that evidence can be used to find that the fingerprints were from that person. The 
consequences of that, of course, would be that it is supportive of the prosecution’s contention that the 
accused man was the man who entered the store. 
… 
In this case, the expertise of Mr Gordon was not challenged, in other words, it was not said that he is not 
an expert, but the suggestion put to him was that like any human bring, he can make a mistake; it is a 
subjective judgment that he makes, although he said it did not happen certainly in this case.194 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that ‘the judge’s summary would have left the jury with the 
impression that the process undertaken had been completed to a point that established 
certainty when this was not supported by the evidence.’195 This suggests that the way 
fingerprints evidence is routinely reported and presented in most Australian jurisdictions – as 
a categorical identification – is not admissible in Victoria. Ghebrat is anomalous and seems 
to have been ignored.196 
 The only substantial challenge to fingerprint evidence in Australia – JP v Director of 
Public Prosecutions – was launched by a junior barrister in a regional town in New South 
Wales.197 JP was alleged to have broken into a house, and ruffled through draws, while the 
elderly residents were in bed. A minor, he was prosecuted in the Children’s Court for 
aggravated break and enter based on a single latent fingerprint match – ‘identified to’ his left 
thumb.198 JP’s barrister had read the article ‘How to cross-examine forensic scientists: A 
guide for lawyers’ – an NRC report-inspired propaedeutic for lawyers.199 The case was heard 
before a magistrate (without a jury); in consequence we have written ‘reasons’.200 
 The Crown relied on the testimony of a fingerprint examiner and an expert report that was 
not compliant with the jurisdictional expectations set out in the Code of Conduct for Expert 
Witnesses.201 The report did not explain what was done, list assumptions (e.g. uniqueness of 
fingerprints), explain the basis for the opinion, identify the ‘specialised knowledge’ (required 
by s79 of the UEL), or refer to any limitations or uncertainties. There are, for example, no 
references to ACE-V and the process of review involved. There are no references to error, 
uncertainty, limitations, what the latent fingerprint examiner knew about the case when 
undertaking the comparison, and no images are included with the report. There are no 
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references to any of the scientific reviews. Rather, the report was merely a very short and 
opaque statement that purported to positively identify JP as the source of the latent print 
recovered from the scene. Given these deficiencies (which were ubiquitous among Australian 
fingerprint reports at the time – exemplified in Bennett), the defence challenged the 
admissibility of the expert report and the related opinion. 
 During the proceedings the fingerprint examiner was questioned in detail about ACE-V, 
validation, error, expressions, cognitive bias, uncertainties and limitations.202 He was 
unfamiliar with scientific research in these areas and did not know about the NRC and NIST 
reports. He had not read NSW Police training materials on cognitive bias. He did not 
undertake his (ACE-V) analysis in sequence and appears to have commenced with the 
comparison. Nevertheless, he was ‘100 per cent’ confident in his opinion and rejected the 
possibility that he had made an error in this or any other case.203 The high quality of the latent 
print and the existence of 35 points in common were raised, for the first time, during 
questioning. 
 In assessing the fingerprint evidence, the magistrate concluded: 
 
In this matter I have oral and written evidence from [the fingerprint examiner].  His evidence was 
unshaken on his view as to the matching of the thumbprint of JP.  In my view I disagree with the 
submissions in this matter, he has given sufficient evidence in these proceedings as to how he reached 
that determination.  As an expert his expertise was not shaken, his opinion was not shaken.204  
 
This, despite the examiner conceding ‘that he had not read a lot of the literature referred to … 
in the cross-examination.’ The examiner contradicted the express conclusions of the NRC and 
NIST reports, testifying that provided the ‘protocol [i.e. ACE-V] was followed properly it 
should not involve bias or incorrect assessment.’ 205 We encountered other examples in 
Section 2. When asked he preferred his own beliefs and NSW police procedures to the 
findings and recommendations of the NRC and NIST, even though he was not familiar with 
their reports and recommendations or relevant research. His response to questions not only 
disclosed a surprising level of ignorance (for a legally-recognised expert witness), but his 
answers were inconsistent with, and combative toward, shared findings and recommendations 
from scientific organisations of unquestioned authority. 
 The admissibility of the fingerprint evidence (and report) and the conviction were pursued 
on appeal. The appellate court indicated that while the report ‘set out the methodology that 
was applied in examining the fingerprints’ it did not state ‘what that examination revealed’.206 
Instead, there was ‘simply a statement of the ultimate opinion’. Deficiencies, such as the 
report not providing ‘scientific criteria for its accuracy to be tested’ and not explaining the 
reasoning process, were said to be repaired by the examiner’s oral evidence – specifically his 
answers during cross-examination.207 Though how this was actually accomplished remains 
something of a mystery. In reviewing the admissibility case law, the appellate court drew on 
Bennett, Tang and Dasreef: 
 
The judgments in Bennett and the observations of Spigelman CJ in Tang at [144] indicate that “little 
explicit articulation or amplification” of the outcome of the application of the methodology is required to 
satisfy the second condition of admissibility of an opinion about the correspondence between two 
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fingerprints (Dasreef at [37]).208 
 
The appellate court read Bennett as requiring ‘some explanation or statement of what the 
examination revealed …must be provided for the evidence to be admissible, albeit not 
much.’209  
 In terms of proof, the court concluded that ‘there was no material to indicate that, to the 
extent the criticisms were sustained’ – from the NRC, NIST and Fingerprint Inquiry reports – 
‘they materially affected the weight to be attached to [the examiner’s] opinion that the 
fingerprints were identical.210 The court accepted that: 
 
it was open to the his Honour to conclude that there was no material to indicate that, to the extent the 
criticisms were sustained, they materially affected the weight to be attached to [the examiner’s] opinion 
that the fingerprints were identical. Otherwise his Honour had the distinct advantage of being able to 
observe [the examiner] give evidence and respond to criticism.211 
 
Notwithstanding detailed cross-examination on materials that directly questioned the ability 
to categorically identify, the Court found that at ‘no stage … was it contended that [the 
examiner] was not suitably qualified to undertake a fingerprint analysis and express an 
opinion that two fingerprints were identical.’212 In terms of the admissibility challenges, and 
the omission of the assumption that ‘no two persons have the same fingerprint’ the Court 
indicated that: 
 
That omission is irrelevant to the admissibility of the report in that the relevant opinion was treated by the 
presiding magistrate as only being a statement to the effect that the two fingerprints were identical. His 
Honour reasoned for himself as to whether that fact suggested that it was JP’s fingerprint.213 
 
The appellate court was satisfied that the ‘certificate set out the methodology that was 
applied’ but, disagreeing with the magistrate, concluded that ‘nowhere in the certificate was 
there any statement of what the examination revealed.’214 Rather, the certificate reported the 
‘ultimate opinion’ about the match and its implications. This opinion was ‘insufficiently 
supported by any reasons … for it to be admitted into evidence.’215 While the certificate was, 
on that basis, technically inadmissible, the admissibility of the opinion fell to ‘be assessed by 
considering the entirety of his oral evidence and not just the certificate’. The prosecution was 
not prevented from ‘remedying’ any ‘deficiency’.216 The examiner’s description, during his 
testimony, of what he had done was presented as rendering his opinion not merely admissible 
but persuasive given that the identification of JP was based upon it. Ironically, the very cross-
examination that exposed a complete lack of familiarity with fundamental scientific research, 
scientific criticisms and limitations with ACE-V, was presented as having remedied any 
deficiencies in the opinion and the failure to explain the reasoning and method.217 The range 
of issues raised by the defence on appeal was dismissed as issues for weight or 
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‘metaphysical’ and therefore irrelevant.218 The failure to provide criteria, tender ‘comparison 
charts’ and ‘specify or provide the necessary scientific criteria for its accuracy to be tested’ 
were described as issues for judicial discretion, rather than admissibility.219 
 However perfunctory the treatment at trial and appeal, JP was the first time that an 
Australian court was asked to consider underlying methodological issues and the implications 
of scientific research and advice for latent fingerprint evidence.220 Notwithstanding detailed 
cross-examination on the NRC and NIST reports, these are not cited in the written decisions 
by the trial and appellate courts. The examiner’s inability to accept them as authoritative – 
because he was not familiar with them – meant that they were not available to impugn his 
credibility or inform the evaluation of his conclusion. They were effectively marginalized in 
the evaluation of the opinion and the determination of guilt. They were not, in effect, (in) 
evidence.221 
 The trial court accepted the latent fingerprint examiner’s evidence as complete proof and, 
quite bizarrely, questioned the status and findings of reports by prestigious scientific and 
technical organisations, and Justice Campbell in Scotland, though without actually naming 
them. Consider the following: 
 
The difficulty of course with a lot of material that was cross-examined on is there is no method, no 
chance to actually test the validity of those arguments.  I note that a lot of that material, there is a report 
there from 2008 or 2009 but I do not have the actual name in front of me, and a follow up report in 2012 
provided to judicial bodies of the United States.  There is no evidence of any action taken on those views 
by those researchers or otherwise.  The report from Scotland does not take it any further than his opinions 
being on the balance of probabilities that would assist further inquiries.  No great depth as to what the 
actual error was and how that could potentially relate to the matter in this matter.222 
 
The only time ‘validity’ is raised is to question the considered and convergent conclusions of 
premier scientific organisations and independent judicial inquiries; all pejoratively 
characterised as ‘arguments’. And, perhaps even more problematic, in the context of an 
accusatorial trial, the magistrate cast limitations and error as issues for the defence. 
 
B. Legal continuity: Scientific insights lost to post-JP decision-making 
Lack of engagement with scientific knowledge and scientific recommendations has meant 
that insights from JP do not form part of the formal legal record. Like other challenges that 
are unreported or reported in ways that do not engage with scientific materials, insights are 
effectively lost to legal consciousness and experience. Consequently, other lawyers and 
judges are not apprised of problems, issues and materials raised in the truly exceptional case 
where a reliability challenge is launched. Lawyers and judges are not only seemingly 
oblivious to scientific research and scientific recommendations and their implications, but 
they seem to have an exaggerated view of the value of the latent fingerprint evidence. A good 
example of this ignorance and the persistence of epistemologically superficial challenges to 
latent fingerprint evidence can be observed in the aftermath of JP, in the South Australian 
case of R v Parry.223 
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 The appeal in Parry concerns problems in the processing and disclosure of the latent 
fingerprint evidence. Parry’s fingerprints were originally linked to an aggravated robbery 
through a set of reference prints, obtained in unrelated circumstances in 2007, and uploaded 
on NAFIS – the national fingerprint database.224 That identification was performed by 
Godden, verified by Andrews and reviewed by Lewis.225 Another comparison was 
subsequently undertaken, using what are characterised as ‘inferior’ quality reference prints. 
These were obtained on Parry’s arrest for the robbery in 2013. This comparison produced less 
conclusive evidence. Using the 2013 reference prints, Neilson concluded that the ‘impression 
does not contain sufficient clear ridge detail for a positive identification … however it cannot 
be excluded as having been made by the right ring finger [of] Parry’.226 That conclusion was 
verified by Noack and reviewed by Greenlees. Subsequently, when the disparity was realized, 
just days before trial, communications between the prosecutor and the police led to the 
resolution of the discrepancy between the two conclusions – specifically, the positive 
identification and the inability to exclude. Noack prepared a new statement using the superior 
2007 prints as a reference. With these prints he identified three latent fingerprints to Parry (to 
two different fingers) and concluded that Parry ‘cannot be excluded’ in relation to two other 
latent fingerprints.227  
 On appeal, Parry challenged the failure to adjourn proceedings to allow him to call Neilson 
(who was away), the failure to exclude Noack’s evidence because of the difference between 
the comparisons using the two different sets of reference prints (from 2007 and 2013, 
respectively), limitations placed on the cross-examination of Noack, the unfair prejudice 
alleged to have been created by reference to Parry’s fingerprints being on the NAFIS 
database, as well as inadequate directions about forensic disadvantage and identification 
evidence. The appeal was unsuccessful, concerns about inadequate disclosure and the 
unwillingness to delay proceedings were found to be inconsistent with both the materials 
available to the defence and decisions made by the trial counsel; such as ‘positively 
eschew[ing] adjournment’.228 
 What is interesting for our purposes is how the trial and appeal – by experienced counsel – 
proceeds entirely on grounds that are inattentive to scientific research and reliability issues.229 
Even the ground that tentatively explores the inability to explore communications between 
the examiner (Noack) and Neilson does not engage with the extensive literature on human 
factors, particularly the danger of cognitive bias.230 Rather than focus on the documented 
risks of examiners undertaking comparisons, verification and review in circumstances where 
they are aware of the expected result, the ground of appeal appears to be focused on 
‘collaboration’, really some kind of implied conspiracy, between Noack and Neilson because 
of Neilson’s apparent unavailability.231 
 There are no references to the scientific reports and recommendations. The trial and appeal 
in Parry proceed as though nothing had happened since Bennett in 2006 and perhaps even 
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It is important at the very outset to reiterate that this article does not contest the admissibility 
or continuing use of latent fingerprint evidence to assist with identification. Rather, the 
concern is with the lack of legal engagement with scientific knowledge and insights, in 
particular: the dearth of epistemologically-informed challenges; the historical mis-
representation and exaggeration of the value of latent fingerprint evidence; its likely over-
valuation by lay decision-makers; the actual frailty of trial safeguards; along with apparent 
judicial indifference (or insensitivity) to emerging scientific research and its implications for 
understanding legal practice.  
 It would seem to be necessary, as a condition for admission, that the proponent of forensic 
science evidence know and disclose the known value of the evidence in order to place 
decision-makers in a position where they might be able to rationally evaluate it.232 Where 
evidence has been used by the state for a century, and is in routine use, it cannot be the 
responsibility of the defence to identify omissions, fundamental methodological oversights 
and limitations of general application in order to persuade a jury of their significance in 
individual adversarial proceedings. To adopt such a lax, capricious and inefficient approach 
to opinion recognised as expert places unbearable strains on the defence, and relieves the 
state of responsibility for formally evaluating the ‘scientific’ procedures it routinely 
represents as not merely probative but reliable and sometimes even infallible.  
 
A. The myth of admissibility standards and critical legal scrutiny  
There are no reported decisions on the admissibility or probative value of latent fingerprint 
comparison that are substantially engaged with scientific research, let alone validity and 
scientific reliability. Australian courts have never required it. Rather, early courts asserted 
that fingerprint comparison was part of the ‘science of identification’, ‘based on experiments’ 
and that ‘individuality … is … generally recognised’.233  
 At one level, given prevailing admissibility rules and jurisprudence at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, this might not be surprising. 234 However, we should recognise that this 
accommodation allowed evidence to be admitted without being formally evaluated or 
appropriately qualified in reports and testimony. Our admissibility rules did not require latent 
fingerprint examiners to formally evaluate their procedures, or to provide insight into 
limitations, or to express their opinions in scientifically-defensible terms. As the way 
fingerprints were collected, processed and analysed was transformed, slowly evolving 
adjectival rules (including the introduction of new uniform evidence law from 1995 and 
Codes of Conduct for expert witnesses just a few years later) were not mobilized and applied 
in ways that led to enhanced scrutiny or placed appropriate expectations on latent fingerprint 
examiners. There were few epistemologically-based challenges to latent fingerprint evidence, 
and over time complacent examiners (appearing before complacent courts) became less likely 
to provide reasons, identify specific points of similarity or provide images to the defence – 
e.g. Bennett and JP. Even after the release of the NRC, NIST, PCAST and AAAS reports, 
latent fingerprint examiners continue to report and testify in ways – i.e. offering categorical 
identification without reference to accuracy – that are not compliant with jurisdictional rules 
(requiring ‘knowledge’) and procedural expectations (requiring the disclosure of limitations).  
 Since early recognition, in the first years of the twentieth century, latent fingerprint 
evidence has been continuously admitted in Australian criminal courts. And, it continues to 
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be admitted in the same form, even though traditional expressions are ‘overstated and are 
now widely recognized as indefensible.’235  
 
B. The convenient myth of trial safeguards 
Safeguards that are epistemologically insensitive – that do not attend to scientific research – 
are safeguards in name only. This study directly challenges prevalent legal beliefs about the 
effectiveness of trial safeguards and adversarial proceedings. In order to better understand 
both their limitations and their ability to instill in judges a false sense of confidence, consider 
the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the positive identification in Blacker. A century before 
empirically-based insights into the performance and abilities of latent fingerprint examiners 
were available, before training was formalized and standards developed, on appeal the 
fingerprint evidence was said to have been ‘carefully given and thoroughly tested.’ In 
addition, we are told that: 
 
The jury also were very carefully directed by the learned Judge as to the risk of error to which evidence 
of this class is open, and as far as the conduct of the trial is concerned every precaution was taken to 
guard against any wrongful impression being conveyed to the jury. 
 
There is no evidence of meaningful testing or caution. This was not a ‘new science of 
identification’ and it was not ‘based on experiments’ that were oriented toward improving 
accuracy or comprehension. The assessment by the Court of Appeal, like many similar 
judicial assertions over more than a century, is a hollow assertion based largely on legal 
impressions (and collective legal ignorance). Such assertions may help to reassure remote 
audiences about the administration of justice, but careful directions on the risks were not 
possible because most of the risks were unknown (or not recognised at law). Our courts did 
not possess or require evidence of validity or scientific reliability. There is no sense in which 
these and subsequent judges were being disingenuous, but they were recounting and relying 
upon untutored impressions and beliefs. How could a judge who was not conversant with the 
accuracy of a procedure ‘carefully direct … as to the risk of error’? How could they ‘guard 
against any wrongful impression’?  
 In Parker, and almost every subsequent case where the admissibility of latent fingerprint 
evidence was raised – almost always in relation to some kind of non-epistemic issue – 
examination-in-chief and cross-examination (and careful judicial ‘instructions’) were 
presented as appropriate mechanisms to test and explain the evidence. In terms of evidence 
and proof, provided the jury ‘were satisfied with the witness under examination and cross-
examination to arrive at the conclusion … that was sufficient to justify a conviction.’236 In 
practice, challenges were not attentive to epistemology and so did not provide trial and 
appellate courts with insights and materials to facilitate rational decision-making. Even when 
procedural impediments (such as the failure to produce a report identifying points of 
similarity on photographs – as in Bennett) or epistemological problems were raised explicitly 
(as in JP), trial and appellate judges were not particularly engaged with the issues. Challenges 
and questions rarely made a difference. 
 What is surprising in an accusatorial system of justice is that where the issue loomed 
Australian judges expected (and continue to expect) impecunious defendants to address, 
indeed overcome, the state’s dereliction – that is, its non-disclosure, omissions, oversights 
and exaggeration.237 In JP, bizarrely, scientific research and advice on the very procedure 
used by the fingerprint examiner were characterised as abstraction (even metaphysical) and 
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not considered relevant to practice or identification in the specific case – see also 8.D, 8.E, 
8.F and 8.G.238 Rather than consider error from the perspective of scientific reports and 
recommendations, the magistrate expected the defendant to somehow identify an actual error 
– presumably relying on the non-compliant expert certificate (or report), that provided little 
meaningful information.239 In JP, the fingerprint examiner’s opinion on identity and the 
procedure used to produce it is used to trump pertinent scientific research and criticism.240 
 Among this sample of the leading Australian fingerprint decisions, trial safeguards were 
repeatedly presented as the appropriate ‘solution’ to problems with forensic science evidence. 
This approach ought to be considered imprudent because over the course of a century trial 
safeguards resulted in only one court, a Children’s Court in Dubbo, hearing about the kinds of 
issues regarded by scientists as fundamental. Even that exposure was indirect, through 
questions posed during cross-examination.241 The availability of trial safeguards did not 
facilitate appropriate exploration of the sorts of questions and issues required to understand 
and evaluate latent fingerprint evidence. Reliance on trial safeguards did not lead to latent 
fingerprint evidence being presented or understood in the ways that attentive scientists insist 
are appropriate. The requisite information has never been required or provided. Even now 
that latent fingerprint evidence is known to be foundationally valid, with an error rate that 
appears to be (impressively) low, disclosure of limitations and recognition of the reality of 
error – required by Codes of Conduct and Practice Notes – remains exceptional. 
 The only conspicuous effect of trial safeguards on the presentation of latent fingerprint 
evidence, across more than a century of routine use in Australia, was the expectation from 
Parker and Ghebrat, that fingerprint examiners should not contend that all fingerprints are 
different (or unique). That is it. No other significant constraints have been placed on 
admission and reliance. There are no constraints on positive identification, even though that is 
inescapably predicated upon fingerprints being unique (and uniqueness somehow enabling 
examiners to positively identify persons). Fingerprint reports that are non-compliant with 
jurisdictional rules, such as Codes of Conduct, are routinely admitted (or excused). Failures 
and omissions are said to be repaired at trial; sometimes through the actions of defendants, as 
in the cross-examination in JP.242 Apparently nothing defendants (or appellants) can do or 
say would lead to the exclusion or qualification of latent fingerprint evidence. Australian 
judges are far too ready to excuse fingerprint examiners and prosecutors.243 
 To be clear, trial safeguard might work if latent fingerprint examiners complied with codes 
in good faith. They might work if prosecutors insisted on compliance and disclosure and 
explained the forensic science evidence they rely upon in terms that capture its known value – 
embodying their obligations around truth and fairness as ‘ministers of justice’.244 Better 
resourced and better informed defence counsel might effectively raise questions about 
methods and other epistemological issues. They might even be able to recruit and use rebuttal 
experts effectively.245 And, trial judges who were more conversant with scientific and 
technical forms of evidence, or applied meaningful admissibility standards, might be better 
                                                        
238 JP, [60]. 
239 Consider ‘Science Friction: Streamlined Forensic Reporting’ (2018) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
240 In the NSW Judicial Commission Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book, at 355, in introducing ‘Expert Evidence’, the 
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knowledge not adduced by the parties’ (2016) 25 Griffith Law Review 383. 
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positioned to tailor (more) appropriate instructions and informed reviews. The emphasis is on 
‘might’. Primary protections should not be reliant on procedures that repeatedly fail.  
 In principle, it seems better to regulate the admission of expert evidence rather than try to 
repair exaggerated claims during adversarial proceedings before non-technical audiences. The 
frailty of trial safeguards places a premium on admissibility decision-making. Unfortunately, 
admissibility standards in all Australian jurisdictions are inattentive to (validity and scientific) 
reliability and judges have neither imposed nor enforced meaningful conditions on the 
admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence. Admissibility standards were weak historically 
and remain weak. Modern reliance on earlier admissibility decisions (or practice, in the 
absence of reported decisions) and even longstanding legal practice may not reveal much 
about the value of forensic science evidence.246 
 
C. Subverting the rational evaluation of expert evidence 
Trial procedures and safeguards are intended to provide means of exploring and testing 
evidence and placing the decision-maker in a position conducive to making sense of – i.e. 
rationally evaluating – it, especially where the evidence is contested. Rules of evidence and 
procedure, such as s79(1) of the UEL and Codes of Conduct for Expert Witnesses, are 
designed to provide parties with timely information to enable them to consider their 
options.247 Rules requiring impartiality, disclosure, the provision of reasons, and 
identification of ‘knowledge’, are intended to encourage moderation in expert performances 
and to bring limitations, uncertainties and disagreement to light. 
 This study suggests that the reports (and certificates) prepared by latent fingerprint 
examiners have not placed decision-makers – whether defence counsel, prosecutors, judges or 
jurors – in a position to rationally evaluate their evidence. Consider the reports provided in 
Bennett and JP, for example. Consider also the testimony in JP. This evidence was not 
presented in a way that reflected its actual value. There was a lack of research support, no 
reference to standards, no reference to uncertainties, no reference to an indicative error rate, 
and criticisms and concerns from mainstream scientists were not disclosed. This was not 
always just a case of omission. In JP, the examiner’s assumptions and beliefs were mis-
represented as fact or true.248 The examiner expressly rejected the possibility of error and 
repeatedly represented ACE-V as infallible. The examiner expressly dismissed authoritative 
scientific reports and reviews that he had not read. This testimony deprived decision-makers 
of the ability to gauge the value of the fingerprint evidence and appreciate some of the range 
of limitations. JP is atypical only in the sense that defence counsel was aware of, and sought 
to elucidate, these and other epistemological issues. 
 Our courts seem to have approached latent fingerprint evidence accepting the self-serving 
claims of examiners and their abilities at face value. They assumed opinions were correct. It 
was left to the defence to try to locate and explain the very information that fingerprint 
examiners and prosecutors were formally obliged to disclose and address – where 
identification by fingerprint was in issue. In the absence of judicial concern with validity and 
scientific reliability, how were decision makers to address the requirement that the opinion be 
based on ‘specialised knowledge’? How were they supposed to gauge the probative value or 
weight of the evidence – even ‘at its highest’?249 In the absence of knowledge, decision-
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247 See Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) Schedule 7 and cases such as 
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makers were compelled to rely upon other information and their impressions when 
determining the value of the evidence.250 Rather than formal studies of the abilities of 
examiners applying ACE or ACE-V, in the handful of cases where epistemic issues were 
raised, decision-makers were obliged to rely on the demeanour and confidence of the 
examiner, the performance of trial counsel examining and cross-examining, popular 
impressions about latent fingerprint evidence, the fact of admission and long legal reliance, 
along with guidance from epistemologically-starved trial judges, along with review by 
epistemologically-starved appellate courts.251 
 Decision-makers continue to be confronted with the task of evaluating the evidence in 
conditions where they are deprived of the very information required to do so rationally. 
Existing procedures, rules and assumptions compel decision-makers to speculate. 
 
D. Problems with expert-jury boundary work 
One of the consequences of the failure to place juries in a position where they could make 
sense of the latent fingerprint evidence is that it is unclear how they were supposed to – as 
judges in Parker (notably Hodges), Lawless, O’Callaghan and Bennett seemed to require – 
evaluate the expert evidence without undertaking their own analysis of the prints. Courts have 
done little to assist the jury to fulfill this ambiguous and somewhat heroic legal expectation. 
How are juries to decide? What were they supposed to do when presented with the prints? 
Reported decisions caution juries against comparing the prints or simply deferring to expert 
witnesses.252 However, decision-makers are not given the information required to evaluate 
opinions and related claims.  
 
E. Identifying an error and other expectations imposed on the defence 
There seems to have been an unstated and practically insurmountable expectation that 
fingerprint evidence is correct and the defence must demonstrate a reason why it should not 
be relied upon. This approach is inconsistent with the terms of s79(1), the Code of Conduct 
for Expert Witnesses, the obligations on prosecutors, as well as the burden of proof in 
accusatorial trials, following Woolmington. 
 It is not the responsibility of the defence to identify an error; and they will rarely be in a 
position to do so. Rather, it is the responsibility of the state, through the prosecutor, to 
eliminate all reasonable doubt consistent with non-guilt. There are two important points to 
make here. First, the risk of error associated with a forensic science procedure should be 
negated by the state where that possibility is raised.253 The state, through the prosecutor can 
rely on latent fingerprint evidence but that reliance should be constrained by its known value 
– as demonstrated through appropriately designed scientific studies. Claims of positive 
identification and error-free performance are inconsistent with the available evidence. They 
are, according to the AAAS, ‘indefensible.’254 Defendants should be entitled to rely on the 
known limitations of latent fingerprint evidence.255 
 Secondly, the defence will hardly ever be in a position to demonstrate an error even when 
one has occurred. Opinions about fingerprints are based on an examiner’s perception and 
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cognition.256 Yet, the defendant is somehow expected to challenge this subjective assessment 
(and its exaggerated presentation as complete evidence of identification) displaced spatially 
and temporally from the circumstances of its production. Defendants may not be provided 
with information about the collection and continuity of the sample, the search(es) on the 
database (and the pool of candidates), whether other examiners (dis)agreed about sufficiency 
or identity, which features were considered similar, the reasons differences are considered 
apparent (and not real), any notes, what the examiner knew about the investigation and the 
suspect (the cognitive bias issue), the conditions of verification, as well as information about 
the individual examiner and their personal proficiency and professional history.257 Though, 
even the provision of such information does not enable defendants to ‘look inside’ the 
examiner’s head in order to identify error or unconscious bias. 
 The possibility of cross-examination does not somehow repair non-disclosure or allow the 
defence to determine how or where an error might have been made. At best it might expose 
derogation and non-compliance, but these are routinely excused by judges.258 
 
F. Epistemology versus the beliefs of a latent fingerprint examiner (or bureau) 
One persistent though misguided response to the occasional challenge to latent fingerprint 
evidence is the heavy reliance placed on the testimony (really impressions) of experienced 
latent fingerprint examiners. This reliance preceded the existence of scientific research 
(before 2009) and persists insensitive to it (after 2009). By not requiring evidence of validity 
and scientific reliability, trial and appellate courts seem to be suggesting that specific 
identification decisions made by individual fingerprint examiners somehow trump or 
circumvent general research evaluating the procedures used to produce these very opinions.259 
This risks becoming irrational. A result (really opinion) obtained using ACE-V should not be 
expressed in terms stronger than ACE-V has been shown capable of producing. Trial and 
appellate courts must direct their attention to formal (i.e. general) evaluation because this 
provides scientific insight into actual abilities. These studies assist with presentation and the 
rational attribution of a value to the evidence.  
 Rather that rely on the impressions of latent fingerprint examiners, scientific research 
provides the appropriate framework for understanding the evidence.260 The examiner’s 
opinion cannot rise above the scientific research, even if the examiner is oblivious to that 
scientific research, is confident, appears to have fared well (i.e. was ‘unshaken’) in cross-
examination, and so on.261 The fact that the examiner in JP – a legally recognised expert – 
was not familiar with the only formal studies of his ‘method’ might be considered 
alarming.262 It reveals something about legal regulation of expertise and the ability to place 
decision-makers in a position to evaluate the opinion.263 
 This point is not restricted to latent fingerprint evidence but applies to all scientific, 
technical and medical evidence, especially procedures in routine use. These should be 
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formally evaluated so that we have a reasonable idea about their value, rather than admit 
opinions and rely on the pronouncements of those using proffering, marketing, and 
advocating them in conjunction with the vagaries of individual adversarial proceedings. 
 
G. The primacy of epistemology (over other ‘legal’ issues) 
There is a supplementary issue here. Once again it extends beyond latent fingerprint evidence 
to other forms of forensic science and forensic medicine evidence. Most of the historical 
challenges to latent fingerprint evidence were focused on legal-procedural issues, around the 
collection and use of prints, the use of photographs, the marking and enlargement of 
photographs, the use of reference prints collected from minors, non-compliant reports, the 
task left to the jury, judicial directions and so forth. However, it makes no sense to waste time 
and resources litigating such issues before the value of latent fingerprint procedures are 
formally evaluated and understood – i.e. known. Logically, we should want to know the value 
of a procedure and the conditions that govern its application and use (particularly the terms of 
expression), so that we can consider whether we should even care if reference prints were 
legally obtained or judicial directions appropriate. Before we waste time and money litigating 
the peripheries of expert opinions courts should require proponents to demonstrate that the 
procedure is valid and scientifically reliable – that is, the opinion is based on ‘specialised 
knowledge’ derived ‘from ‘study or investigation’.264 We should be confident that those 
allowed to express their opinions are demonstrably expert and their opinions are based on 
knowledge (rather than experience and legal tradition).265 
 
H. The common law ‘method’ 
One of the issues emerging from the foregoing discussion is the capricious nature of legal 
engagement with latent fingerprint evidence. Case-based responses to scientific evidence may 
be unprincipled, inconsistent and even incoherent.266 Our common law legal systems treat 
each case discretely because of its peculiar characteristics. While every case may be different, 
this does not provide a particularly persuasive explanation for inconsistent approaches or the 
failure to engage with validation where the underlying procedures (such as ACE-V) are 
substantially similar. While the size, quality, and number of prints may vary between cases, 
the actual processing and reporting should be consistent, indeed standardised. 
 In focusing on individual cases, our common law courts have not dedicated sufficient 
attention to system issues – questions around the fingerprint ‘method’, its limitations and the 
ability to categorically identity persons. They have preferred the testimony of individual 
examiners and their willingness to make categorical identifications in circumstances where 
there was no meaningful disclosure and no legal awareness of the substantial criticisms and 
concerns expressed by peak scientific organisations.  
 Common law courts have been less interested in general scientific studies than specific (or 
case-based) opinions, even if the specific opinions seem to be inconsistent with the results of 
the general research and difficult to characterise as knowledge – whether scientific or 
specialised. The focus on individual cases has tended to blind courts to methodological 
problems and constrained systematic engagement with scientific research and its implications 
for legal practice. This essay seems to suggest, based on a century of legal ignorance, that our 
past practices have not served us well. 
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I. Feedback and the failure to learn (or encourage learning in others) 
One of the most disturbing features of this account is that legal knowledge of latent 
fingerprints has not advanced in more than a hundred years. Indeed, the high point of 
jurisprudence in terms of epistemology seems to be the dissent in Parker. Contemporary 
judges do not require latent fingerprint examiners to support their claims with evidence. 
Contemporary judges do not require any evidence of validity and scientific reliability.267 
They allow latent fingerprint examiners to identify persons in categorical terms and leave 
appropriate qualifications and caveats for the defence and trial safeguards, even though they 
only seem to have been raised on a few occasions in the course of a long century. 
Furthermore, no defence counsel – perhaps with the exception of counsel in Ghebrat – seems 
to have persuaded a trial or appellate court that they matter. Rather inappropriately, 
longstanding legal practice and socio-legal experience stand in the place of scientific research 
and scientific knowledge. This is unfortunate because many other forensic ‘sciences’ have 
based themselves on latent fingerprint comparison and adopted the ACE-V ‘method’ – e.g. 
ballistics and toolmarks, shoe, foot, tyre and voice comparison, along with identification from 
images. In consequence, poorly formed and pre-scientific ideas about forensic science and 
medicine continue to inform the production of forensic science evidence, admissibility 
decisions (unconcerned with reliability), presentation and forensic testing, the exercise of 
mandatory and discretionary exclusions (unconcerned with reliability), the understanding of 
proof and standards of appellate review. 
 The trial and appeal in JP, like the decisions in Bennett, Parry and even Ghebrat, yield no 
epistemic insights. They offer no evidence of institutional learning or sophistication. There is 
no evidence that the judicial officers in JP have any more insight or sophistication than those 
who encountered fingerprint evidence a century earlier. The judges and almost all of the 
lawyers seem to be oblivious to relevant scientific research and its significance. In the 
absence of scientific and technical sophistication the judges in Lawless, O’Callaghan, 
Bennett, JP, Parry and Hillstead seem to be in substantially the same position as the judges in 
Blacker and Parker. Here we can observe, for those who choose to look, just how inadequate 
conventional rules, procedures, jurisprudence, Codes of Conduct and responsibilities 
(devolved onto prosecutors, defence lawyers and trial judges) are in practice. In order to 
defend the legal performance and the status quo, it would seem to be necessary to accept that 
the way fingerprint evidence is routinely reported, used in investigations, and presented in 
courts (along with ordinary challenges), are appropriate.268 This article, and its heavily 
reliance on scientific research and recommendations, reveals that such a position is untenable. 
At the very least it is inconsistent with the expectations of a system of justice that purports to 
be rational and interested in taking systematic advantage of scientific, technical and medical 
knowledge. 
 Not only have our courts failed to obtain scientific knowledge in their attempt to inform 
the admission and use of forensic science evidence, but perhaps an even greater loss has been 
the failure to use emerging scientific knowledge to improve our understanding of criminal 
justice processes. A tremendous and perhaps unprecedented opportunity has been 
squandered. The scientific reports discussed in Section 3 provide authoritative and 
unprecedented insight into forensic science evidence that, if accepted, strongly suggests that 
legal practice has been ineffective or misguided and perhaps both. By not providing 
conditions in which prosecutors and defence counsel could productively introduce such 
knowledge into admissibility determinations, trials and appeals, Australian courts have 
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deprived themselves of knowledge in their attempts to produce correct verdicts fairly – doing 
justice in the pursuit of truth.269 
 One of the most important means of improving performance is through the provision of 
timely feedback.270 Current practices deprive our courts of meaningful feedback. In 
something of a reactionary manner our courts have sought to defend their (historical) practice 
and portray what they have been doing for more than a century, without empirical evidence of 
performance, insight, or independent feedback, as justice.271 For those who contend that trial 
safeguards are performing well, we can only wonder about the evidence supporting such 
contentions. Where are the epistemologically-informed challenges and where is the judicial 
recognition of the centrality of validity and scientific reliability? Where is the evidence of 
cross-examination and judicial guidance drawing attention to, and clearly explaining, the 
significance of these issues? Where is the evidence of latent fingerprint evidence being 
presented in scientifically-defensible terms? At this point it is far easier to identify 
authoritative but unprincipled rejections of reliability – in Tang, Tuite and R v Chen – than 




More than a century ago, the Chief Justice of Victoria, lamented that ‘the matter has not been 
investigated by scientists generally so that we can say that the propositions relied on by the 
Crown are accepted scientific facts’. Madden’s concerns about identification by latent 
fingerprint seems to have been vindicated by subsequent events. Almost a hundred years after 
his dissent, the reviews he believed were necessary were finally undertaken. While his 
concerns are not simply aligned with modern scientific methods and norms, recent research 
and the knowledge produced has finally placed latent fingerprints on a scientific foundation. 
Opinions about latent fingerprints turn out to be a probative, but not infallible, form of 
evidence. The results of scientific research, along with the considered advice of multi-
disciplinary collectives of independent scientists, suggest that latent fingerprint examiners 
should not positively identify persons, and that their results should be expressed with an 
indication of performance (and error) – ideally in probabilistic terms. Fingerprint reports 
should include this information and refer to scientific research and mainstream scientific 
criticisms. 
 The Chief Justice’s concerns are important for the way they illuminate ongoing 
jurisprudential problems. The language adopted by Madden is eerily similar to the way the 
US Supreme Court defined knowledge in Daubert. We can these observe similarities in the 
High Court’s Honeysett decision: 
 
the person’s training, study or experience must result in the acquisition of knowledge.  The Macquarie 
Dictionary defines “knowledge” as “acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or 
investigation” (emphasis added) and it is in this sense that it is used in s 79(1).  The concept is captured 
in Blackmun J’s formulation in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc:  “the word ‘knowledge’ 
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.  …  [It] applies to any body of known 
facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds”. 
 
Our rules and jurisprudence require it. Yet when it comes to latent fingerprint evidence no 
judge has reproduced the principled position pursued by Madden.272 When it comes to 
                                                        
269 H.L. Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
270 See e.g. L. Lo Pucki, ‘Legal culture, legal strategy, and the law in lawyers’ heads’ (1996) 90 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1498. 
271 Yet, there has been no serious epistemic engagement and all challenges concerned with the accuracy of identification 
have failed. 
272 Tuite might be an exception, though it was undermined by a side-wind in IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14. 
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forensic science evidence, our courts have rarely required specialised knowledge and 





The judgment from the first reported English fingerprint case, R v Castleton [1909] 3 Cr App 




Castleton was subsequently presented as authoritative on the issues of admissibility and 
proof. It was influential in Australia, the United States, and Canada. Though, the actual 
decision exemplifies profoundly limited engagement with the procedures used by examiners 
and their abilities. On the issue of sufficiency, the court both defers to the jury and trusts its 
own comparison of the fingerprints. Revealingly, Darling J’s question seems to imply, in a 
way that persists (its spectre re-appears in JP, for example), that there is an expectation that 
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the appellant might somehow produce another person with ‘identical’ fingerprints (or point to 
an error in the identification). 
 
 
END 
 
